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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a final judgment, in a civil
contract and tort action, entered by Judge Ronald 0. Hyde, of
the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, and from
two prior non-final partial summary judgments also entered by
Judge Hyde.

The final judgment originally appealed from

[Second Revised Judgment, R. 1351] and an Order denying a
motion for new trial [R. 1324] were both entered on March 16,
1988, and Notice of Appeal was filed on April 8, 1988
(R. 1361).

The appeal initially was taken to the Utah Supreme

Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as
amended).

The appeal was then transferred to the Court of

Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and
78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953 as amended).
During the pendency of the appeal, jurisdictional
questions arose because of confusion created by the District
Court's bifurcation of certain claims prior to trial.

If the

District Court intended to sever those claims pursuant to Rule
21, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, then the March 16 judgment
was the final order in the case even absent certification
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

If, on

the other hand, the District Court intended to order only
separate trials under Rule 42(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, then the March 16 judgment was not a final order
because it did not contain a Rule 54(b) certification.

See,

U.S. v. O'Neill, 709 F.2d 361, 366-369 (5th Cir. 1983).

The
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Combes anticipate that this jurisdictional issue will be
resolved by a temporary remand, during which the March 16 judgment will be amended to include a Rule 54(b) certification, and
an amended notice of appeal will be filed.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court improperly granted the

plaintiff-buyers (Breuer, Harrison and their corporation,
referred to collectively as the "Developers") summary judgment
rescinding the Real Estate Contract with defendants Keith and
Evelyn Combe ("the Combes") due to disputed issues of material
fact concerning:
(a) whether the Developers knew about the pipeline affecting the subject property before entering into the
contract, but still chose to go forward with the purchase, and
therefore waived the alleged breach;
(b) whether the Developers' recission claims are
barred by waiver, laches or estoppel because, even though they
knew of the pipeline, they waited for five years to seek
rescission, during which time they specifically and repeatedly
reaffirmed the contract; and
(c)

the interpretation of conflicting and

ambiguous provisions of the contract concerning the scope of
title warranties.
2.

Whether the trial court incorrectly ruled that

there were no material facts in dispute and that, as a matter
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of law, the Combes did not have a malpractice cross-claim
against their attorney, co-defendant Robert E. Froerer.
3.

Whether the trial court incorrectly concluded

that, as a matter of law, the Combes had no cross-claims
against Froerer [or his principal, co-defendant Attorneys Title
Guarantee Fund, Inc. (ATGF)] for abstractor's negligence.
4.

Whether the trial court erred in summarily con-

cluding that the Combes had no claim against ATGF under the
policy of title insurance, even though the terms of the policy
were ambiguous as to the scope of coverage.
5.

Whether the bifurcation of the Developers' claims

against Froerer and ATGF, on the day before trial was to begin,
was prejudicial to the Combes.
6.

Whether, even if rescission was properly granted,

the trial court made legal errors in determining amounts to be
refunded to the Developers, by:
(a)

offsetting the fair rental value of the

property based on agricultural use, rather than highest and
best use; and
(b)

determining fair rental value without regard

to fair market value.
7.

Whether the award of over $130,000 in prejudgment

interest was inequitable and excessive as a matter of law.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff Developers commenced this action in
October, 1984, to rescind a December, 1979 Real Estate Contract
to purchase land from the defendant Combes.

[R. 1]

The

Developers also asserted claims against co-defendants Froerer
and ATGF, and the Combes asserted cross-claims against these
co-defendants.

[R. 563]

A separate action by the Combes for

foreclosure of the Real Estate Contract was consolidated.
The grounds for recission alleged by the Developers
were defects in title resulting from a pipeline crossing the
subject Property.

The Combes asserted that the Developers knew

of the pipeline before executing the Real Estate Contract and
had waived any right to recission, or were barred by estoppel
and laches.

The Combes also denied breaching any warranties of

title in the Contract.
The Combes further claimed that their attorney,
co-defendant Robert Froerer, negligently represented them, by
drafting documents which allegedly required the transfer of
property through warranty deed, and then by failing to timely
or accurately complete the title work he was also retained to
do.

The Combes also claimed that Froerer and the title

insurer, ATGF, were liable for faulty title work, based on
abstractor's negligence and breach of the title policy.
The trial court granted the Developers' summary judgment motion against the Combes, ruling that there had been
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no waiver, estoppel or laches, and that the Combes breached
warranties of title in the Contract.

[R. 474]

The trial court

later granted summary judgment against the Combes dismissing
all of their claims against Froerer and the title company.
[R. 878]
A trial was finally held, but was limited to determining the amount of restitution to be received by the Developers
from the Combes.

On the day before trial, the Court bifurcated

the Developers' own claims against Froerer and ATGF, over the
Combes' objection.

[R. 996]

The jury empanelled in an advi-

sory capacity was discharged, and the Court found against the
Combes.

The Combes (including Keith's brother Clair) were

required to refund to the Developers $236,966.21, plus pay
$133,192.64 in prejudgment interest.

[R. 1353]

These amounts

significantly exceed the current value of the property, as
returned to the Combes.

The Court credited the Combes only

with the fair rental value of the property as agricultural
property, rather than according to its highest and best use.
The Court also denied the Combes' motion for new trial, which,
among other things, asked for a trial of the issues previusly
disposed of by the two partial summary judgments, based on
testimony and proffers at trial.

[R. 1260, 1262, 1324]

Copies of the important District Court rulings are
included in the Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Unless otherwise indicated, references to the record
on appeal are designated as M R. M , and references to the trial
transcript [R. 1405] are designated as M Tr. M .
A.

Background

1.

The property ("Property") which is the subject of

this lawsuit is an undeveloped parcel of approximately twenty
acres located in South Ogden, Utah.

It was originally part of

a farm developed by defendant Keith Combe's grandfather.

The

properties immediately to the south and west of the Property
had been developed as residential areas prior to the events at
issue here.
2.

[Tr. 202-203, 70, 215]
Keith Combe was raised on the farm, but left

shortly after the Second World War, when he turned sixteen.
Although Keith remained in the Ogden area he never again lived
on the farm and returned only to visit his parents.

After

working for a short period of time on the railroad, Keith purchased a small fast-food operation, a business which he continues to own at the present time.

The Combes have limited

experience with the sale and purchase of real property.

[Tr.,

pp. 195-203]
3.

Sometime in the early 1960's the Weber Basin

Water Conservancy District began constructing a water pipeline
through the area.

This pipeline crosses the Property.

All

negotiations with the Conservancy District were handled solely
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by Keith's father and mother.

At the time of the sale to the

Developers, the Combe children did not know that the pipeline
had been constructed on the Property.
4.

[Tr., pp. 213-216]

Sometime in the 1970's Keith's mother decided to

convey the Property to Keith and his three siblings, and the
Property was divided into four parcels.

Three of the parcels,

including Keith's, were deeded directly to each child.

The

fourth parcel, designated to go to Keith's brother Clair, was
held in a trust managed by First Security Bank (the "Bank") for
Clair's benefit.

[Tr., pp. 196-197; Affidavit of Keith Combe,

R. 1257]
5.

The Developers are California residents who are

in the real estate development business.

By 1979 Breuer and

Harrison each had about thirty (30) years of experience in real
estate development, having been involved in numerous large
scale residential and commercial projects in Southern
California.

They had extensive experience with the sale and

purchase of real property, and the purpose and use of title
reports and title insurance.

[Tr., pp. 60, 72-73]

B.

The Sale of the Property to the Developers.

6.

Sometime during 1979, the Developers became

interested in purchasing property in Utah for development.
They had some familiarity with Utah, having visited the Wasatch
Front area on a number of occasions.

Accordingly, they

contacted Steve Keil, an Ogden real estate agent, whose
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father-in-law was a superintendent on one of their California
projects.
Nielson.

Keil worked at a real estate firm owned by Bruce
Keil, Nielson, and another agent, Duane Brian, later

became partners with the Developers in developing the
Property.

[Tr., pp. 61-62, 129-132, 221, 233-234]
7.

During that summer of 1979, the Developers were

shown a number of large parcels in and around Ogden.

One of

the parcels which they examined was the Property owned by Keith
Combe and his siblings.

The Developers physically inspected

the Property, reviewed plat maps, looked at demographic and
economic data for the area, and reviewed other information from
Keil.

At no time prior to executing the Real Estate Contract

did the Developers meet or even talk with the Combes or a
representative of the Bank.

Their first meeting with Keith

Combe did not occur until five years later, during the late
summer of 1984, when they first demanded rescission of the
purchase agreement.

[Tr., pp. 61-62, 83, 198, 221-224; Keil

Deposition, R. 1412, pp. 6-9]
8.

Before deciding to purchase the Property, the

Developers hired an engineering firm, Great Basin Engineering,
to analyze the suitability of the Property as a residential
subdivision.

The owner of Great Basin Engineering was Jay

Anderson, who had witnessed the construction of the pipeline,
had designed several subdivisions in the area and knew that the
existence of the pipeline would have to be accounted for in
designing and constructing any subdivision.
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[Tr., pp. 224-233]

9.

Prior to the date of purchase, Great Basin per-

formed a wide variety of engineering tasks and analysis for the
Developers.

Great Basin prepared preliminary subdivision plat

maps showing possible layouts for a tract of single family
homes, so that the Developers could determine whether or not
the property could be subdivided profitably.

Great Basin also

did extensive soil testing, onsite ground water analysis,
runoff flow analysis, and met with various government
agencies.

[Tr., pp. 224-233, 251-262]
10.

The actual design work was assigned to Charles

Olsen, an engineer at Great Basin.
is referred to as a "base sheet".

Olsen first prepared what
The base sheet showed the

property boundaries, surrounding subdivisions and streets.
also showed the pipeline running across the property.

It

Olsen

then sketched out a number of different subdivision configurations using semitransparent paper which was placed over the
base sheet.

After he had come up with a satisfactory layout,

Olsen attached it to a copy of the base sheet.

All of the sub-

division layouts sketched by Olsen showed the pipeline and its
thirty foot wide easement.

[Tr., pp. 249-264.

A

reduced copy

of Olsen's subdivision layout dated September 18, 19 79 is
included in the Addendum.
11.

The pipeline is labelled "aqueduct."]

Olsen's preliminary sketches and layouts were

shown to Keil on or about September 18, 1979, by Anderson.

At

this meeting Anderson specifically explained to Keil why it was
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necessary to configure the subdivision around the pipeline.
Five days later, the Developers went to Great Basin, met with
either Anderson or Olsen, and received copies of the subdivision layouts, all of which showed the pipeline.

[Tr., pp.

229-232, 235, 256, 264, 330-333; Keil Deposition, R. 1412, pp.
15, 22]
12.

After reviewing the subdivision layouts which

showed that the Property could be subdivided into approximately
57-60 building lots, Keil negotiated a purchase agreement with
the Combes.
13.

[Tr., pp. 75, 232-233, 271-272]
The Combes and the Bank were anxious to sell

their parcels, but the remaining children were not.

Accord-

ingly, the first task was to arrange a series of property
trades between Keith and his brothers and sister so that the
Combes and the Bank would end up with the entire property.
Keith ended up owning approximately three-fourths of the
property and the Bank owned the remaining parcel.

An Ogden

attorney, co-defendant Froerer, was retained and paid by the
Combes and the Bank to prepare the necessary documents and
complete these transactions.

[Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp.

6-8, 19-20, 48, 55-56; Deposition of Combe, R. 1411, pp. 25-29]
14.

Froerer was also retained and paid by the Combes

to prepare the agreement selling the Property to the Developers.

Froerer first drafted a preliminary agreement which was

executed by the Developers on or about November 1, 1979.
[Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 6, 37]
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15.

Froerer then prepared a final agreement for the

Combes entitled "Real Estate Contract", which set forth a total
sales price of $410,880.00 and required a down payment of
$75,000.00.

Beginning on December 31, 1980, and continuing for

the next three years, the Developers were to make annual
interest-only payments.

On December 31, 1983, the balance of

the purchase price was due in full.

The Real Estate Contract

also stated that the property was specifically being purchased
for the construction of a subdivision.

[Froerer Deposition, R.

1418, p. 38; A copy of the Real Estate Contract is part of the
Addendum; Tr., pp.64]
16.

Paragraph 8 of the Real Estate Contract drafted

by Froerer required the Combes and the Bank to warrant title to
the Property, to furnish a title policy and to convey the
Property by warranty deeds:
8. Seller warrants that there are no liens
or encumbrances on the property herein-above
described and agrees to furnish to Buyer at
Seller's expense the title policy showing
good and marketable title in said property
(said title policy to be furnished at the
time of the receipt of down payment from
Buyer). Further, Seller agrees to execute
and deliver to Buyer, or assigns, good and
sufficient warranty deeds covering title to
the above-described property when subdivided
and as paid for in accordance with the terms
herein-above set out.
[Froerer Deposition, R. 1418; Combe Deposition, R. 1411,
pp. 25-29]
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17.

Paragraph 8 conflicted with two other paragraphs

in the contract.

Paragraph 4 required that an escrow account

be set up, that the Combes convey title by warranty deed to an
escrow agent to be named later, and that this agent convey
title to the Developer by Special Warranty Deed as payments
were made.

This escrow was never created and an escrow agent

was never named.

Paragraph 5 disclaimed warranties:

"The

Seller hereby expressly disclaims any and all warranties and
representations, express or implied, as to the state of the
property, its condition, quality, character or suitability or
fitness for any sue [sic], whether existing or contemplated,
matters of zoning, or in other respect."
18.

(Emphasis added.)

At no time did the Combes ever direct Froerer to

include the warranty requirements set forth in paragraph 8.
Froerer never explained these requirements to the Combes, and
they did not understand what the requirements meant.

[Froerer

Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 26-27, 30, 54; Combe Deposition, R.
1411, pp. 95-96]
19.

Froerer also agreed to conduct the title search

on the Property for the title insurance policy required by
paragraph 8.

This work, and the policy, were also paid for by

the Combes and the Bank.

[Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp.

8-12, 18-20, 62]
20.

Although Froerer did not finish the title search

until after the closing, he did not inform the Combes of this
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fact.

At no time did Froerer warn the Combes, his clients,

that they might not be able to warrant title.

In reliance on

Froerer, the Combes believed that they had complied with the
terms of the contract and that title insurance had been
obtained to protect them.

[Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp.

27, 30, 52-54; Combe Deposition, R. 1411, pp. 42-49]
21.

Even once it was completed, Froerer's title

search did not reveal the pipeline and recorded easement
running across the Property.

[Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp.

25-26; Complaint, R. 1]
22.

The title insurance policy was ultimately written

by Froerer on behalf of co-defendant ATGF.

At the time,

Froerer was an agent of ATGF, owned stock in the company, and
regularly researched titles and wrote title insurance for the
company.

[Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 10-11, 15-18, 45-46]
23.

The title policy appeared to protect the inter-

ests of the Combes as well as the Developers, because the
policy specifically represented that the insured interest was
vested in the Combes and the Bank.

[A copy of the title policy

is included in the Addendum; Combe Deposition, R. 1411, pp.
42-44]
24.

Froerer also coordinated and handled all aspects

of the December, 1979 closing.

He obtained the execution of

the Real Estate Contract by all parties, obtained the down
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payment from the Developers, and forwarded funds to the Combes
and the Bank.

Froerer withdrew payment of his fees for draft-

ing the contracts, as well as his fees for the title search and
the title policy, from the funds disbursed to the Combes and to
the Bank.

Since Froerer never set up the escrow account

required by the contract, the Combes and the Bank never executed the warranty deeds that would have transferred the
Property to the unnamed escrow agent.

[Froerer Deposition, R.

1418, pp. 6-8, 18-20, 51, Exhibit 8]
Cc

Events Following the Sale of the Property.

25.

After the Real Estate Contract was signed, the

Developers had Great Basin Engineering complete the subdivision
layout by adding sewers and utilities to the plat which it had
previously prepared.

The final plat was completed by Great

Basin Engineering in January of 1980.

This final plat, like

all of the previous plats, showed the pipeline running through
the Property.
26.

[Tr., pp. 256-257]
The Developers spent most of 1980 attempting to

complete a sale of the Property to a third party, J.C.K. Land
Development ("J.C.K.M).

J.C.K. made an offer to purchase the

Property even before the final Real Estate Contract with the
Combes was signed.

Several different Offers to Purchase and

Earnest Money Agreements were drafted and the Developers
received a $15,000.00 down payment from J.C.K.
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However, the

sale was never completed and the $15,000.00 deposit was forfeited to the Developers.-'

[Tr., pp. 149-152, 234-235,

334-343]
27.

After the resale to J.C.K. failed to materialize,

the Developers undertook to continue developing the property
themselves.

The next two years were primarily devoted to

getting governmental approval for the subdivision.

Most of the

work was done by the local partners, Nielsen, Brian and Keil,
who had used the real estate commission they had earned from
the Combes' sale to purchase partnership interests.

[Tr.,

pp. 71, 124-125, 92-93, 95, 86, 154]
28.

Until December of 1984, all yearly interest pay-

ments, of $35,000 each, were made.

In the Fall of 1982, the

Developers drafted an amendment to the contract which gave them
an additional two years to pay the principal balance of the
purchase price.

This amendment was executed by the parties on

or about November 24, 1982. This amendment was followed by a
second one, dated January 3, 1983.

The second amendment

deferred, for six months, payment of one-half of the $35,000.00
interest payment which had been due at the end of 1982. The

-' This $15,000.00 was retained by the Developers
and represents income received during their occupancy of the
property. However, the trial court did not give the Combes and
the Bank a credit for this amount.
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Combes received no consideration for their execution of these
amendments.

[Tr., pp. 65, 109-111; 81-84, 204; These amend-

ments are included in the Addendum]
29.

The Developers admit that as of February 1983,

they were fully informed about the existence of the pipeline
and its easement.

This information was contained in another

title report given to the local partners by the Combes, who
sought to borrow money to finance their restaurant and needed
to use the Property and the Real Estate Contract as collateral.

During the next eighteen months, the Developers made no

attempt to rescind the contract, or even to alert the Combes
that they might seek rescission.

[Tr., pp. 84, 157-161,

178-179]
30.

Development efforts continued throughout 1983 and

into 1984 and included hiring a new engineering firm to obtain
M

fresh ideas" about developing the Property.

One of the con-

cepts explored and platted out by this firm was the development
of most of the Property as a condominium project.

As with the

original plans done by Great Basin Engineering, all of the
plats, drawings and plans prepared by the new firm showed the
pipeline.

Further, the deferred interest payment for 1982 was

made in June of 1983, and interest for 1983 was paid in
December of that year.

[Tr., pp. 84-86, 133-134, 174-175,

185-186]

-16-

31.

During this period, the Developers repeatedly

reaffirmed their commitment to the contract in other ways as
well.

On a number of occasions, Nielsen, a partner of the

Developers, told Keith Combe that they did not consider him to
be responsible for the error by the title company and Froerer,
and would look only to those parties for any liability.
Further, Nielsen repeatedly stated that the Developers would
honor the terms of the contract as amended.

[Tr., pp. 158-161;

Deposition of Nielson, R. 1420, pp. 44-45]
32.

To give themselves more time to successfully

develop the project, the Developers asked for and received two
additional amendments to the Real Estate Contract in February
of 1984,

The first stated that at least 15 acres of the

Property would be developed as condominiums and partial payments would be made to the Combes as each unit was sold.
Further, the Combes were required to subordinate their interest
in part of the Property so that the Developers could obtain a
construction loan.

The second amendment further extended the

final payment under the contract until December 31, 1988, if
the Developers had paid at least $120,000.00 in principal by
the end of 1985.

The Combes received no consideration for

executing these amendments either.
173-174, 204.

[R. 84-87, 158-161,

These amendments are also included in the

Addendum.]
33.

After extensive redesign work, the Developers

sought bids for construction of phase I of the project in the
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Summer of 1984.

However, correspondence between the Developers

and the new engineering firm indicates that the bids were much
higher than expected.

Although some effort was made to trim

costs, by the Summer of 1984 falling real estate prices made
the project economically unfeasible.

[Tr., pp. 179-180;

Deposition of Nielson, R. 1420, pp. 67-69]
34.

In August 1984, Breuer and Harrison flew to Utah

and for the first time personally met with Keith Combe.

The

purpose of this meeting was to inform him that unless a substantial reduction of the purchase price was given, they would
seek rescission of the contract.
rescission had been raised.
filed this lawsuit.
35.

This was the first time that

Shortly thereafter the Developers

[Tr., pp. 187-189, 87]

Subsequent to the Combes' sale to the Developers,

the real estate market declined drastically, and the value of
the Property dropped from about $410,000 to about $280,000.
[Tr. 192-193]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The District Court erred in awarding the Devel-

opers summary judgment on their recission claims.

Viewed in

the light most favorable to the Combes, the record established
that the Developers, or their agents, knew of the pipeline and
easement before they executed the contract with the Combes.
Accordingly, the Developers waived the alleged breach of contract and any claim for damages, as well as recission.
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(a)

Then, the Developers waited nearly five

years to seek rescission, during which time they made annual
interest payments, attempted to develop the property, entered
into contracts to resell the property, and orally and in
writing amended and reaffirmed the contract.

Thus, the Devel-

opers also waived their claims to recission by affirming the
contract with knowledge of the alleged breach.
(b)

The Developers also are estopped and barred

by laches from seeking rescission because their delay injured
the Combes.

During this five-year period, the value of the

Property dramatically declined due to market factors having
nothing to do with the pipeline.
(c) Also, the Court improperly resolved factual
issues created by ambiguities in the Real Estate Contract concerning the scope of warranties of title given by the Combes.
2.

The trial court also erred in summarily disposing

of the Combes' crossclaims against Froerer and ATGF.

The

facts, viewed in the light most favorably to the Combes, show
that their attorney, Froerer, committed legal malpractice by
failing to adequately protect his clients' interests during the
sale.

Further, the facts also established the Combes' claim

for abstractor's negligence against Froerer and the title
company because the title search was untimely and negligently
performed.

The Combes relied on the performance of a timely

and accurate search, to their detriment.
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The Combes are also

entitled to have their claim against ATGF for breach of the
title insurance policy determined by a jury, due to ambiguities
in the language of the contract about the scope of coverage.
3.

On the day before the trial, the Court abused its

discretion in ordering that the Developers' damage claims
against Froerer and ATGF be severed from the Developers' claims
for restitutionary damages against the Combes.

This was highly

prejudicial because it prevented the Combes from pursuing their
defense that any damage to the Developers was caused by Froerer
and ATGF, rather than the Combes.

Also, it gave the Combes

inadequate time within which to prepare an alternative theory
of defense.
4.

The trial court also made significant errors in

the calculation of restitutionary damages and offsets.

The

rent offset allowed by the court was legally inadequate because
the property was valued at its agricultural use rather than at
its highest and best use as a residential subdivision.

Also,

the Court refused to consider fair market value in determining
fair rental value.

Finally, there was no legal or equitable

basis for the award of prejudgment interest and the amount of
interest was miscalculated.
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEVELOPERS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE DEVELOPERS'
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PIPELINE CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT AS TO WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES, AND
BECAUSE THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WAS AMBIGUOUS.
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The Combes1 defenses to the Developers' claims for
recission and damages included waiver, estoppel and laches.
The key issues raised by each of these defenses were the purely
factual issues of (1) when the Developers learned of the pipeline, and (2) whether their delays in asserting rescission, and
their other actions inconsistent with rescission, were
unreasonable.
Factual issues also were created by the ambiguities in
the Real Estate Contract concerning what warranties of title
the Developers were receiving.

For example, if the unnamed

escrow agent was supposed to give only special warranty deeds,
as provided by paragraph 4 of the contract, these would not
cover the pipeline easement created even before the Combes took
title.

Further ambiguities as to the scope of warranties were

created by paragraph 5.
On the issue of when the Developers learned of the
pipeline, they contended that they didn't know about it until
February, 1983.

However, the drawings prepared by the Devel-

opers' engineers showed the existence of the pipeline and easement even before the Developers agreed to purchase the property
in December, 1979.

Keil Deposition, R. 1412, pp. 15, 22. If

this evidence were accepted by a finder of fact, not only did
the Developers waive any claims for recission, they also waived
or were estopped from asserting the breach itself, and any
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claim for damages as well.

See, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239

(Utah 1980), Leone v. Zuniqa, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.2d 699 (1934).
Even if the Developers didn't learn of the pipeline
until after they entered into the purchase agreement, there was
also evidence in the record that they knew of the pipeline from
the drawings of their own engineers before they took numerous
actions affirming the contract.

These actions included

attempts to resell the Property, continued efforts to develop
it, payment of interest in 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983, and execution of the various amendments to the contracts in 1982, 1983
and 1984. Again, if this evidence were accepted by a finder of
fact, at least the recission claims were waived, or were barred
by estoppel or laches.

Id.

In granting the Developers* Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court itself acknowledged that M[t]here is a dispute
of fact as to the exact date at which the buyers became aware
of the existence of the easement and became aware of the existence of the aquaduct."

Finding of Fact No. 11, R. 512. None-

theless, and in spite of the contrary evidence in the record,
the Court improperly decided that factual issue.

The Court

found that M[t]he easement was not shown on any sketches or
plat maps given to the buyers prior to the time that they purchased the property'1 [Finding No. 23, R. 514], and that M[t]he
first time the easement was shown on any drawings prepared by
Great Basin Engineering was after the new title report was
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given by the sellers to the buyers' agent in 1983".

[Finding

No. 24, R. 514]
The Court also impermissibly resolved the ambiguities
in the Real Estate Contract created by the conflicts between
the warranties of title in paragraph 8 and the disclaimer of
all warranties in paragraph 5. Further, the Court overlooked
the reference to special warranty deeds in paragraph 4.

See,

Finding No. 12 [R. 512], amended to change it to a conclusion
of law.

[R. 554]
Even if the Combes' contentions concerning contractual

ambiguities and concerning the Developers' knowledge of the
pipeline are ignored, the Developers' own contention that they
didn't learn of the pipeline until February, 1983 created additional factual issues concerning waiver, estoppel and laches
that also could not be resolved by summary judgment.

After

February, 1983, the Developers still waited for 18 months
before first asserting any right to recission.

In the mean-

time, they executed two amendments to the contract in 1984,
made two interest payments, continued their attempts to develop
the property, and represented to the Combes through Nielsen
that they intended to honor the contract and were considering
claims only against Froerer and ATGF.

[Deposition of Nielsen,

R. 1420, pp. 44-45, Tr. 160-161]
There is no question that the above evidence established the elements of waiver, which were the Developers'
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intentional relinquishment of a known right.

See, Hunter v.

Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983) [quoting American Savings
and Loan Ass'n v. Blomguist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1
(1968)].

Also, the Developers could not prevent this waiver

from occurring by secretly reserving their right to rescind:
The unexpressed, subjective reasons for the relinquishment of a right are largely irrelevant. M[T]he
guestion whether waiver will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the
party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect
which his conduct has had upon the other party." 28
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver section 158 at 843
(1966). Stated another way, one cannot prevent a
waiver by a private mental reservation contrary to an
intent to waive, where his or her actions clearly
indicate such an intent, (citations omitted).
B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food Service, 82 Utah Adv.
Rep. 35, 37 (Utah App. 1988).

Furthermore, waiver is almost

always a factual issue to be resolved at trial and not on a
motion for summary judgment.

Jd., Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d

1226 (Utah App. 1988).
A finder of fact could have reasonably found that any
delay in asserting recission, and any actions inconsistent with
an intent to rescind were fatal to the Developers' recission
claim:
The plaintiff in an action for fraud has the
option to elect to rescind the transaction and recover
the purchase price or to affirm the transaction and
recover damages. . .
As to the finding of waiver, the court in Chester
v. McDaniel [504 P.2d 726, 727-728 (Or. 1972)] pointed
out certain important distinctions in the type of
waiver involved. The court observed, any delay on the
part of the defrauded party, especially his remaining
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in possession of the property received by him under
the contract, and dealing with it as his own, may
constitute a waiver of the right to rescind the
contract.
Dugan v. Jones, supra, 615 P.2d 1247.

See also, Perry v.

Woodall, 20 Utah 2d 399, 438 P.2d 813 (Utah 1968) (attempting
to renegotiate contract after learning of grounds for recission
constituted waiver).

Recission claims have been rejected based

upon delays less than the 18 months alleged by the Developers
here, let alone the five years claimed by the Combes. For
example in Frailey v, McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840
(1949), this Court held that a ten month delay, while the
purchaser tried to transfer his water rights to another location, was too long.

See also, Zuniga v. Leone, 77 Utah

494, 297 P. 1010 (1931), (a one year delay, during which the
original contract was amended, was too long); McKellar Real
Estate & Investment v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128 (1923) (a
six month period during which the buyer occupied the property
constituted a waiver).
Whether the Developers' delay in asserting recission
is measured from December, 1979, or February, 1983, evidence in
the record also established the prejudice to the Combes from
that delay, required for a finding of estoppel.

See, Celebrity

Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694
(Utah 1979).
1983).

See also, Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah

Based upon the decline in the real estate market during
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these periods, the value of the property plummeted.—'

[Tr.

pp. 184-185, R. 1394; Deposition of Nielsen, R. 1420, p. 17]
Similarly, the harm to the Combes resulting from the
Developers' lack of diligence in asserting their rights was
sufficient for a finding of laches.
1262, 1264 (Utah 1980).

Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d

See also, Papanikolas Brothers Enter-

prises v. Suqarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256
(Utah 1975).

Had the Developers sought recission immediately,

the Combes would have had the opportunity to resell the
property for an amount that could have made all parties whole,
especially since the pipeline and easement did not significantly affect the value of the property.

[Tr. 269] Moreover,

-'
Similar situations arose in the past, when
declining real estate values prompted claims for rescission,
most notably during the Depression era. Then, as now, the
courts have uniformly refused to allow the purchasers to
rescind under those facts. Pesciarelli v. Trestain, 284 N.W.
656 (Mich. 1939); Browne v. Briggs Commercial and Development
Company, 259 N.W. 886 (Mich. 1935); Berg v. Hessey, 256 N.W.
562 (Mich. 1934); Schafroth v. Ross, 289 F. 703 (8th Cir.
1923); Payne v. Baldock, 287 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App. 1956); Kaufhold v. Cador Construction Company, 156 A. 125 (N.J. 1931);
Griffin v. Axsom, 525 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. App. 1988). The attitude of the courts in those cases was best summed up in Davis
v. Albertson, 172 So. 241, 242 (Florida 1937):
In fact, he [the chancellor] was confronted
by a suit growing out of a typical boom time
transaction in which a zealous purchaser
paid too dearly for his whistle and after
the frolic was over and sanity restored
insisted that his vendor pay for the
confetti.
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had the developers stopped making payments immediately, the
amount needed to make them whole (including items such as the
prejudgment interest that was awarded) would have been much
less.

Instead, the Developers lulled the Combes into believing

that the real estate contract would be honored and payments
could be accepted.
Certainly, all of these circumstances surrounding the
Developers' delays would have to be weighed in order to determine the factual issues of whether those delays were unreasonable and whether equity required the Developers to bear the
risk of loss they caused by sitting on their rights.

These

issues, and the ambiguities in the real estate contract, could
not be resolved by summary judgment.

It was error for the

District Court to do so, and that error must be reversed.
II.
FACTUAL ISSUES ALSO BARRED THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING THE COMBES' CLAIMS AGAINST FROERER AND ATGF
Froerer was hired and paid by the Combes to draft all
documentation for the transfers of parcels between the Combe
siblings, to draft the preliminary and final real estate contracts with the Developers, and to conduct the title search and
procure the title insurance policy required by the latter
contracts.

By performing or agreeing to perform these tasks,

Froerer assumed several distinct but interrelated duties to the
Combes, on behalf of both himself and ATGF.
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One set of duties

was as the Combes' attorney.

Another set was as an abstractor

of title and agent of ATGF, while still retaining his duties as
the Combes' attorney.

A third set was as ATGF's agent for

issuance of the title policy, while also still acting as the
Combes' attorney.
In dismissing all of the Combes' claims against
Froerer and ATGF, the Court entirely overlooked the Combes'
legal malpractice claim against Froerer, and the impact that
the malpractice claim had on the abstractor's negligence and
title policy claims.
the malpractice claim.

The Court's ruling did not even address
[R. 878]

The Court dismissed the abstractor's negligence and
title policy claims on the theory that the duties of Froerer
and ATGF ran only to the Developers.

[R. 878]

However, the

Court failed to take into account that Froerer undertook to
search title and issue a title policy not just as an agent of
ATGF, or for the sole benefit of the Developers, but also as
the Combes' attorney, and to protect their interests as well.
Also, as with the Developers' prior motion for summary
judgment, the Court again failed to take into account contractual ambiguities, this time in the policy of title insurance.
The factual issues created by these ambiguities in the scope of
title insurance coverage, and by Froerer's tangled relationships with the Combes, ATGF and the Developers, made summary
judgment totally inappropriate.
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A.

The Combes Demonstrated a Prima Facie Claim
of Legal Malpractice Against Froerer.

It is rarely appropriate for a claim of legal malpractice to be resolved on a motion for summary judgment:
An attorney is required to possess the
legal knowledge and skills common to members
of his profession, Young v. Bridwell, 20
Ut.2d 332, 338, 437 P.2d 686, 690 (1968),
and to represent its clients interest with
competence and diligence. Dunn v. McKay
Burden, McMurray & Thurman, Utah, 584 P.2d
894, 896 (1978).
Ordinarily, whether a defendant has
breached the required standard of care is a
question of fact for the jury. FMA Acceptance Company v. Leatherby Insurance
Company, Utah 594 P02d 1332 (1979); Jensen
v. Dolan, 12 Ut.2d 404, 367 P.2d 191
(1962). Consequently, a Motion for Summary
Judgment should be denied where the evidence
presents a genuine issue of material fact,
which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving
party, would entitle him to a judgment as a
matter of law. . . [citations omitted]. A
genuine issue of fact exists where, on the
basis of the facts and the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the required
standard. Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Ut.2d
292, 431 P.2d 126 (Utah 1967); FMA Acceptance Company v. Leatherby Insurance Company,
Supra.
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982)
Here, there were at least three different aspects of
co-defendant Froererfs representation of the Combes which
reasonably could be construed as malpractice.

First, and

perhaps most crucial, Froerer failed to complete the title work
prior to the real estate closing.
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He was hired by the Combes,

and paid by them from the proceeds of the sale, to do a timely
title search.

This title work was an extension of the legal

work he did for them in drafting the very contracts that made
it so important that the title search be completed in a timely
fashion.

An untimely title search was the same as no title

search at all, on the facts of this case.
Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct mandates
that Ma lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client1'. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct were not adopted until January 1, 1988, Rule 1.3
basically reiterates Disciplinary Rule 6-10l(A)(3) and EC 6.4
of the former Code of Professional Responsibility.

Froerer's

failure to timely complete a task which was essential to his
clients' interests was negligence on its face.
This nonfeasance was compounded by Froerer's admitted
errors in failing to perform the search adequately once he
finally got around to it.
25-26.

Deposition of Froerer, R. 1418, pp.

His failure to uncover a recorded encumbrance against

the property was negligence as a matter of law.

White v.

Western Title Insurance Co., 710 P.2d 309 (Cal. 1985); Moore v.
Title Insurance Company of Minnesota, 714 P.2d 1303 (Ariz. App.
1985) .
Second, Froerer was negligent in withholding material
information from the Combes. An attorney has a fiduciary obligation to share all important, material information with his
client:
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A client is entitled to all of the
information helpful to his cause within his
attorney's command. If an attorney negligently or wilfully withholds from his client
information material to the client's decision to pursue a given course of action, or
to abstain therefrom, then the attorney is
liable for the client's losses suffered as a
result of action taken without benefit of
the undisclosed material facts. Material
facts are those which, if known to the
client, might well have caused him, acting
as a reasonable man, to alter his proposed
course of conduct.
Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F.Supp. 30, 39, (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
See also, Burien Motors Inc. v. Balch, 513 P.2d 582, (Wash.
App. 1973); Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933
(1962).

Here, Froerer failed to tell the Combes that the title

work had not been completed prior to the closing.

Instead, he

allowed the Combes to go ahead with the sale under the mistaken
impression that they would be able to comply with the terms of
the contract he drafted.
This omission compounded Froerer's earlier failure to
explain to the Combes their obligations, and potential liabilities, under the warranty provisions in paragraph 8 of the Real
Estate Contract.

Such an explanation was vital because the

Combes were inexperienced in real estate transactions, as
Froerer knew or should have known.
Third, Froerer also breached the duty he owed to the
Combes as his clients by simultaneously representing another
client with conflicting interests, and by failing to both
inform the Combes of this conflict and obtain their consent.
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Marqulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1203 (Utah 1985).

See

also, Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and Disciplinary Rule 5-105(c) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Froerer admitted that he was representing Steve Keil,

the real estate agent who was the Developer's agent, and who
was, or would shortly become, their partner.

Yet, Froerer also

understood that he had been hired by the Combes to perform all
the work necessary to complete the transaction, and was to be
paid by the Combes for that work.
46-47]

[R-1418, pp. 6-7, 39-40,

Nonetheless, Froerer never even discussed the conflict

with the Combes, nor advised them to obtain independent counsel
to review the underlying documents and obligations.

Rather, he

allowed the Combes to go ahead with the closing believing that
he was protecting their interests.

[Deposition of Combe, R.

1416, p. 94]
It is almost impossible for an attorney to adequately
protect the interests of both the buyer and the seller in a
real estate transaction.

Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corpora-

tion, Inc., 586 P.2d 1378 (Idaho 1978).

Indeed, the Committee

on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association has
opined that representation of both the buyer and seller in a
real estate transaction is likely to present an irreconcilable
conflict for the attorney.
(Idaho 1982).

Johnson v. Jones, 652 P.2d 650, 653

This conflict of interest arises even if the

attorney's role is limited to determining the marketability of
title:
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Even within the limited area of marketable
title, a situation may exist which cast
doubts on the advisability of accepting the
title. The buyer's attorney would be under
a duty to request the seller to correct the
situation, whereas the seller might properly
contend that the title was marketable, notwithstanding the buyer's assertion. It
would certainly be most difficult for one
attorney under such circumstances to represent both clients with 'undivided fidelity.'
In the matter of Daniel W. Kamp, 194 A2d 236, 239 (N.J. 1963).
Here, the Court attempted to side-step the malpractice
issue by making the factual determination that "Froerer prepared the paperwork; he did not handle the closing."

[R. 880]

Not only was this finding contradicted by evidence in the
record that Froerer did handle the closing [Froerer Deposition,
R. 1418, pp. 6-8, 18-20, 51, Exhibit 8], it missed the point.
There was no dispute that Froerer did substantial legal work on
the transaction.

The issues were whom he was representing and

whether he breached the standard of care.

These were purely

factual issues on which summary judgment should not have been
awarded.
Evidently, Judge Hyde himself was troubled or confused
by his summary judgment on the malpractice claim.

At the con-

clusion of the trial on other issues, he stated that this claim
had not been the subject of the earlier summary judgment disposing of the abstractor's negligence and title policy claims:
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The Court: He [Combe] hasn't been stopped
from [pursuing his claims against] Froerer.
Mr. Ashton:

Yes, you ruled in that regard.

The Court: I ruled in regard to him not
being a beneficiary of that. . . .
The Court: If he's got a negligence action
against Froerer, that isn't what I was
ruling on. We were talking about him coming
under the title policy.
[Tr. 418]
Nonetheless, the judge subsequently reaffirmed his
earlier error in dismissing the malpractice claim.
Motions, November 25, 1987, R. 1176]

[Rulings on

That error must be

reversed, because the Combes were entitled to a jury trial on
the factual issues presented by their malpractice claims
against Froerer.
B.

Factual Issues also Precluded Summary Judgment on
the Combes' Claim against Froerer and ATGF for
Abstractor's Negligence.

By agreeing to perform the title search, Froerer was
not only acting as the Combes' attorney, but also as an agent
for the title company, ATGF.

In their role as title abstrac-

tors, Froerer and his principal, ATGF, owed a separate duty to
the Combes to complete the search in an accurate and timely
manner.
In issuing or agreeing to issue a title report, a
title company assumes different responsibilities than those
covered by the title insurance contract.
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Moore v. Title

Insurance Company of Minnesota, supra.

The company acts as an

abstractor and has a duty to list in the title report all
matters of public record that affect the title.

This duty is

in addition to the company's contractual duties on a policy of
title insurance.

Id. at 1307.

See also, Jarchow v. Trans-

america Title Insurance Company, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. App.
1975).

Further, a title insurer has the duties of a title

abstractor when it inspects title records, even for purposes of
issuance of a title policy.

See, Heyd v. Chicago Title Insur-

ance Company, 354 N.W. 2d 154 (Neb. 1984); Banville v. Schmidt,
37 Cal. App. 3d 92 (Cal. App. 1974.)
The abstractor clearly owes these duties to the
parties with whom he is in contractual privity, such as the
Combes here, who paid Froerer's abstracting fee.

Sickler v.

Indian River Abstract & Guaranty Co., 195 So. 197 (Fla. 1940).
See also, First American Title Insurance Company, Inc. v. First
Title Service Company of the Florida Keys, Inc., 457 So. 2d 467
(Fla. 1984).

However, those duties also extend to all others

who forseeably may rely upon the title search, regardless of
contractual privity8
As explained in First American Title Insurance
Company, Inc. v. First Title Service Company of the Florida
Keys, Inc., supra, third party beneficiary principles apply to
a title search:
When an abstract is prepared in the knowledge or under conditions in which an
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abstractor should reasonably expect that the
employer is to provide it to third persons
for purposes of inducing those persons to
rely on the abstract as evidence of title,
the abstractors contractual duty to perform
the service skillfully and diligently runs
to the benefit of such known third parties.
Id, at 472.

See also, Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title

Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983); Williams v. Polgar,
215 N.W. 2d 149, (Mich. 1974); United Leasing Corp. v. Miller,
263 S.E. 2d 313 (N.C. 1980); Restatement of Torts 2d,
§ 552.

Thus, even if the abstractor's contract is with the

buyer of the property, the abstractor's duties also run to the
seller, as the third party most likely to rely on the search.
See, Malinak v. Safeco Title Insurance Company of Idaho, 661
P.2d 12 (Mont. 1983); Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v.
Ramsey, 507 P.2d 492 (Alaska 1973); Chun v. Park, 462 P.2d 905
(Hawaii 1969) (title company owed duty to seller, buyers, and
bank).
Accordingly, there is no question that Froerer owed
the Combes a duty to perform a timely and accurate title
search, since they were both parties with whom he was in
privity and parties whom he knew would rely on the search.
There is also no question that in failing to timely discover or
report the recorded pipeline easement, Froerer was negligent as
a matter of law.

White v. Western Title Insurance Co., supra.

His liability is also imputed to ATGF as a matter of law.
Restatement Second, Agency, § 219.
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See,

However, Froerer and ATGF argued in the District Court
that the Combes did not rely on his title search, because he
never issued a title report, and the title policy was not
issued until after closing.

In effect, Froerer and ATGF argued

that Froerer's negligence in failing to perform the search
before closing was a defense to his negligence in conducting an
inadequate search.

Although this argument is ludicrous, it

apparently was accepted by the District Court, which found that
there was "no indication that the Combes relied upon any certificate and/or search."

See, Rulings on Motion for Summary

Judgment, R. 880. What the District Court's ruling overlooked
was the evidence in the record that Froerer's actions led the
Combes to believe that he had already conducted the title
search and issued the title policy, and that they had clear,
marketable title to the Property.

[Deposition of Combe, R.

1411, pp. 42-44; Tr. 317-319]
At miniumum, there was a factual issue about whether
it was reasonable for the Combes to rely on Froerer to advise
them if the title search was not completed prior to closing, or
if title defects were discovered, especially since he acted as
their attorney in drafting the contract that required the
search be done.

Accordingly, the summary judgment on the

abstractor's negligence claims must be reversed as well.
C.

Ambiguities in the Terms of the Title Insurance
Policy Concerning Whether the Combes were
Insureds also Created Factual Issues Making
Summary Judgment Improper.
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The District Court also found that the Combes had no
claim against ATGF based on the title insurance policy, because
only the Developers were insured under the policy.

R. 880.

In

making this finding, the Court ignored the plain language of
Schedule A of the policy.

Schedule A (contained in the adden-

dum) insured the interest of the Combes as well as the Developers, or was at least ambiguous on this point.
In interpreting a document, the "first source of
inquiry must be the document itself, considered in its
entirety."

Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657

P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982).

Paragraph number 1 of Schedule A

states that the estate or interest covered by the policy is "an
interest pursuant to that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract"
between the Combes and the Developers.

This should be con-

strued as a reference to the Combes' interest, as well as to
the Developers' interest, since the Combes retained legal title
to the property.
(Utah 1983).

See, Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227

Also, paragraph number 2 states that the "estate

or interest referred to herein" is vested in the Combes.

If

the policy was intended to insure only the Developers'
interest, paragraph number 1 should have referred only to the
"equitable estate" created by the Real Estate Contract.
Further, paragraph 2 should have stated that the insured
interest was vested in the Developers and not in the Combes.
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Another basic rule of contract construction is that
whenever possible a contract should be interpreted so as to
give effect to all of its provisions.
P.2d 733 (Utah 1980).

Jones v. Hinkle, 611

An insurance contract should also be

construed against the insurer.

See, Fuller v. Director of

Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Utah 1985).

Therefore, the title

policy should have been construed as insuring the Combes'
interest, as well as the Developers'.

The District Court's

contrary construction that only the Developers' interest was
insured ignored the language of Schedule A, and the rule of
construction against insurers.
At the very least, the contract was ambiguous, and the
intent of the contract was a question of fact for the jury.
Bartlam v. Tikka, 622 P.2d 1133, (Or. App. 1981).

A jury

should have been allowed to determine the meaning of the contract, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
on the Combes' claim for breach of the title insurance policy.
III.
BECAUSE BIFURCATION OF THE TRIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL TO
THE COMBES, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
After the Developers' motion for summary judgment was
granted in mid-1986, the Combes' repeatedly attempted to get
the remaining issues to trial.

These efforts were blocked by

the Developers, ATGF and Froerer, who on three occasions
objected to trial settings.

[R. 576, 582, 605, 620, 626, 632,
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683, 698]

Each time, those parties claimed that they needed

additional time to complete discovery and prepare for trial.
Finally, a trial date of September 21, 1987 was scheduled based
on the agreement of the parties.

Then, on the day before

trial, the plaintiffs and co-defendants Froerer and ATGF
jointly moved to bifurcate and continue the trial as to plaintiffs' claims against those two co-defendants.

[R. 996, 1406]

No substantial reasons were offered as to why those
claims should have been severed.

Instead, it was inaccurately

stated that the cause of action against Froerer and ATGF was
"separate and apart" from those against the Combes.

Also, it

was claimed, again inaccurately, that different "factual
evidence" was involved.

[R. 996-997; Transcript of Bifurcation

Hearing, R. 1406, pp. 32, 34, 35]

No showing was made, how-

ever, that a bifurcated trial would be more convenient, foster
judicial economy, or most important, avoid injustice.

Most

disturbingly, the severance eliminated the Combes' defenses
based on the wrongdoing of Froerer and ATGF and gave the Combes
inadequate opportunity to prepare new theories of defense.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, taken as a whole,
favor the resolution of issues in a single, consolidated
action.

See, Rules 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, and 42(a);

Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 20 F.R.D. 204
(D. Neb., 1957).

Although a court may order the separate trial
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of issues or claims, it may do so only in "furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice. . .M for all parties involved.
U.R.C.P., Rule 42(b); Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah
1981).
The piecemeal trial of issues is not preferred and
should be ordered only when it is clearly necessary to avoid
prejudice and foster judicial economy.

Payton v. Abbott Labs,

83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979); 5 Moore's Federal Practice
1f 42-38; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure; Civil
§ 2388.

Moreover, when a plaintiff has sued more than one

defendant for the same losses, severance of the claims is
usually denied, even if based on different, and possibly confusing, theories of liability.

C.W. Regan, Inc. v. Parsons,

Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas, 411 F.2d 1379 (4th Cir. 1969);
Durham v. Southern Railway Co., 254 F.Supp. 813 (W.D, Vir.
1966); Wright & Miller, supra.
Although a decision to order separate trials is discretionary, that decision must be reversed where discretion is
abused, as here.

Columbia Irrigation District v. U.S., 268

F.2d 128 (9th Cir., 1959); Franchi Const. Co. v. Combined Ins.
Co. of America, 580 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Peatross v. Board
of Com'rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976) (discretionary decisions should be reversed where they are arbitrary & capricious); Coca Cola Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc.,
690 F.2d 312 (2nd Cir. 1982).
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A discretionary decision which prejudices a litigant
constitutes just such an abuse:
As is true of any other kind of judicial
discretion, it is subject to abuse, and it
is appropriate for us to remand for separate
trials if it appears the prejudice to any
litigant, from consolidation, far out weighs
the benefit.
Liqnell v. Berg 593 P.2d 800, 806 (Utah 1979).

Although

Liqnell dealt with consolidation as opposed to bifurcation, the
same reasoning applies here.

If a separate trial prejudices

the party "against" whom it is sought, while a consolidated
trial would be fair to all litigants, it is an abuse of discretion to grant such a request.

Martin v. Bell Helicopter Com-

pany, 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980); Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., supra; State Mutual Life Assurance
Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63 F.R.D. 389
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) .
Here, bifurcation of the trial was extremely prejudicial to the Combes.

Because the true parties at fault, Froerer

and ATGF, were not present, there was no alternative but to
view the Combes as the culpable parties.

Not only were Froerer

and ATGF absent, but the Court also precluded any reference to
them.

[Tr. 3, 6]

Thus an incomplete tableau was presented at

trial.
The issue to be tried against the Combes was one of
equitable damages.

Therefore, the Combes were entitled to have

the trier of fact hear all the evidence and "use whatever
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factors it finds most appropriate to achieve justice."
v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1977).

Johnson

Instead, the trier

of fact was prevented from seeing that the real basis for
rescission was a faulty title report; that the Developers purchased title insurance to guard against the very circumstance
which occurred here, and that Froerer and ATGF were liable for
the Developers' losses.

In short, equity demanded that the

trial include all of the parties so that liability could be
distributed equitably.
Also, because the bifurcation occurred literally on
the eve of trial, the Combes were prevented from adopting a
different trial strategy, reflecting the fact that they would
be the only defendants at trial.
Thus, upon remand, a single consolidated trial of all
issues should be ordered.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CALCULATED THE AMOUNT OF
RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES AWARDED TO THE DEVELOPERS.
As the result of the above trial, the Second Revised
Judgment was entered requiring the Combes to pay the developers
over $370,000,00.

This sum included the one $75,000.00 prin-

cipal payment made by the Developers, four annual interest payments of $35,000.00 each, some tax payments, and prejudgment
interest in the amount of $133,192.64.

Prejudgment interest

was calculated at 6 percent per annum on payments made through
May 6, 1981, and at 10 percent per annum on payments made
thereafter.
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Although the trial court found that the highest and
best use of the property was for residential development (R.
1330), the Combes were awarded a rental offset in the amount of
only $7500 ($1500 per year).

The trial court concluded that

the "fair rental value" for the property should be based on the
lowest valued use of the land, agricultural use, even though
the Developers purchased the Property for residential development and the pipeline did not interfere with that development.
The trial court also refused to award an offset for the
$15,000.00 that the developers had received when they attempted
to resell the property in 1980.
As a result of the trial court's rulings, the Combes
received back property which was worth approximately
$280,000.00; which was less than what they are required to pay
the Developers.
A.

[Tr. 193-194]

The Court Made a Legal Error in Concluding That
the Fair Rental Value of the Property Had No
Relationship to Its Fair Market Value at Its
Highest and Best Use.

Prior to trial the Developers filed a motion in limine
seeking to exclude all evidence and testimony as to the fair
market value of the subject property.

[R. 927]

The Court

denied this motion, and at the beginning of trial stated that
the fair rental value to be credited to the Combes was directly
related to the property's fair market value.
R. 1406, p. 90]

-44-

[Tr. 6-7;

During trial, the Combes' expert, William Christensen,
testified in detail that the fair rental value of real property
must be calculated based on a reasonable rate of return on an
investment equalling the fair market value of the property at
its highest and best use:
Q.
Now, tell me in what way the actual value of the
property affects the fair market rental value.
A.
Well, simply stated, whenever you have something
of value, you can either get a return on it or not, as
you choose. But typically, if you convert something
to cash and invest it in something that is paying some
return, you will get a fair market return on the
property. And that, in essence, is the concept of
what fair market rent would be, what is a fair return
on the value of the property.
[Tr. 274-275]
Christensen then explained that, here, fair market
value was established by the contract price, and fair rental
value was established by the interest on that amount at the
contract rate:
Q.

Did you look at the general terms of the contract?

A.

I looked at the general terms.

. ..

Q.
Would you have any reason to believe that the
payment amount as shown in there for interest on the
property would be a reflection of the fair rental
value?
A.
[Tr. 278]

Yes, it would be, as a matter of fact.

Christensen further explained that calculating

rental value as a percentage of fair market value was often
done by the power company in compensating a landowner for a
temporary taking.

[Tr. 283-284]
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Notwithstanding this testimony, and the absence of any
contrary evidence, Judge Hyde disavowed his pre-trial ruling,
and concluded that the fair rental value of the property had no
relationship to its market value, at least at its highest and
best use.

As a result, the Combes were credited with yearly

rent of only $1,500.00, although the property had a value of
over $400,000.00 when the contract was executed, even with the
pipeline easement.

[Tr. 269]

This result violated Utah law as set forth in Warner
v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559 (Utah 1985) and a host of other Utah
cases.

See also, Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977);

Perkins v, Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952); Soffe v.
Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983).

All of these cases, which

deal with the enforceability of liquidated damage provisions of
real estate contracts, have grappled with the very matter at
issue here:

How do you calculate the fair rental value for

property held by a buyer during an executory contract?
In these cases the Utah Supreme Court has consistently
concluded that fair rental value is a function of market value:
Moreover, as we noted in Biesinger v.
Behunin, M[f]air rental value necessarily
represents reasonable return (interest) on
investment." The interest and rental value
of the property are merely alternative
methods of measuring the same thing, i.e.,
the value of the use of the property during
the period of buyers occupancy.
Warner v. Rasmussen, supra at 562.

Thus, as a matter of law,

fair rental value equals a reasonable return on the market
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value of the property as established by the contract price, and
is calculated as the annual interest due on the unpaid balance
of the contract, at the contract rate.

See also, Johnson v.

Carman, supra at 374; Soffe v. Ridd, supra.
The holding of these cases is applicable here because
the same principles are involved in calculating the amount that
would have reasonably compensated the Combes for loss of the
value of their property during the Developers' occupancy.

As

the court explained in Warner, a reasonable return on the
investment does not constitute a windfall to the seller but
merely represents the buyer's "cost" of using a valuable asset.
In sum, the interest payments made by the Developers
here were merely the fair rental value of the Property during
their occupancy.

As a matter of law, it was error for the

District Court to order that those payments be refunded by the
Combes.
B.

The Award of Prejudgment Interest Must be
Stricken, Or Substantially Reduced.

The award of $133,192.64 in prejudgment interest,
which is over half of the total payments made by the Developer
under the Contract, was grossly inequitable.

The judge failed

to "look to the totality of the circumstances to make his
determination of what was just and equitable between the
parties."

Stewart v. K & S Company, Inc., 591 P.2d 433, 435

(Utah 1979).

Even if the Developers' five year delay in

asserting their recission claim was not a total bar to that
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claim, it was certainly a factor that equity required the
District Court to consider in determining equitable damages.
During this period, the value of the Property dropped dramatically, and it is now worth only a fraction of its original
value.

Indeed, its value now, as returned to the Combes, is

less than the amount that the Combes are required to return to
the Developers, when the huge award of prejudgment interest is
included.
None of these factors was considered by the District
Court.

Instead, the District Court required the Combes to bear

all risk of loss caused by the Developers' inequitable conduct,
and rewarded the Developers for that conduct by giving them a
return on investment that included interest on interest.
The District Court also failed to consider that it was
the Developers who caused the repeated delays in bringing this
matter to trial.

However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that

a prevailing party who delays proceedings, or even merely
acquiesces in delays, may not be awarded prejudgment interest.
Nielsen v. Drobay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982).
Also, even if an award of prejudgment interest had
been proper, it was miscalculated.

In S.C.M. Land Company v.

Watkins and Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 109 (Utah 1986) the Court held
that prejudgment interest should be calculated at the statutory
interest rate in effect at the time the contract was executed.
Here, as in SCM, the statutory rate when the contract was
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executed was not ten percent per year, but only six percent per
year.

Also, prejudgment interest should not have been awarded

on amounts that, as argued above, should not have been refunded
to the Developers.

Accordingly, not only did the District

Court err in awarding any prejudgment interest, the Court miscalculated the interest it awarded.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Combes respectfully urge that
the summary judgments must be reversed and this matter remanded
for a single trial on all claims between the Developers and the
Combes and all claims between the Combes and co-defendants
Froerer and ATGF.

Alternatively, the damage and prejudgment

interest awards must be stricken, or remanded to the District
Court for new trial or recalculation, with directions to the
District Court to apply the appropriate equitable and legal
factors.
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A D D E N D U M

Tab A

1

TabB

REAL ESTATE CONTRACT

THIS AGREEMENT, made this 29
clay of
December
'
A.D., 19 7 ° , bv and between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his j
wife, anS^FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee,
!
hereinafter designated as Seller, and CASPER J. BREUER and
j
WILLIAM M. HARRISON of Fullerton, California, hereinafter desig- I
nated as the Buyer.
j
WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration
herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the Buyer, and the
Buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase
the following described real property, situate in the County of
Weber, State of Utah, to-wit:
See Schedule A attached hereto and made a part
hereof.

j
j
I
!
j
j

1. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession
;
and pay for said described premises the sum of FOUR HUNDRED TEN
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY ($410,880.00) DOLLARS, (the exact
|
purchase price to be determined after survey; the purchase price ,'
to be determined by multiplying the number of acres by $21,4 00.00),'
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order
_^_^_^___
, strictly within the
j
i
following rimes, to-wit: SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ($75,000.00)
I
DOLLARS cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and
1
the balance of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
j
EIGHTY ($335,880.00) DOLLARS shall be paid as follows:
J

i
Buyer shall pay to Seller interest only for the
first four (4) years of this' contract payable on
the 31st day of December, beginning December 31,
1980. On December 31, 1983, Seller shall pay the
balance of the purchase price, principal and
interest in full.
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to Buyer on the
31 day of December, 197 9.

!
!
j
j
;
j
j
j

2. Said payments are to be applied first to the payment!
of interest and second to the reduction of the principal.
Interest shall be charged from December 31 , 1979 on ail unpaid
portions of the purchase price at the rate of TEN AND ONE-HALF
(10 1/2%) PERCENT per annum.
j
3. The Buyer hereby agrees to pay a late fee of Four (4 5
Percent of any payment that is paid Fifteen (15) Days after the
|
date such payment is due.
i
4. In order to facilitate the performance of the terms j
and conditions of this agreement and to allow for the orderly
|
subdivision and development of said property by the Buyer, the
j
Seller and Buyer agree that an escrow-trust agreement designating J
(to be mutually designated at a later date), as Escrow Agent-Trustt
with appropriate instructions to act in such capacity shall be
executed by the parties. Seller shall forthwith execute and
!
deliver to said trustee a good and sufficient Warranty Deed
j
conveying subject property to said Trustee, with authority for
j
said Trustee to record said conveyance and to thereafter convey i
title by Special Warranty Deed to Buyer upon 3uyer's compliance
•
with the terms and conditions herein set forth and as specifically!
provided for in said Escrow-Trust Agreement. Said escrow
1

I

agreement shall provide authority to said Trustee to execute and j
deliver deeds of reconveyance back to the Seller in the event
i
Buyer defaults.
i
a. Such Trustee herein is authorized and instructed!
to sign and execute, at the request of Buyer, any and all subi
division plats, protective covenants, easements, and rights-ofway which may be necessary or convenient for the orderly develop- I
ment of the subject property, upon presentation of the same by
the Buyer by its duly authorized representatives.
b. The Escrow Holder-Trustee to be authorized and |
empowered to convey all, or part, of said property to Buyer for
the purpose of obtaining financing for cost of installation of the
required off-site improvements throughout the subdivision. In
addition, said construction mortgage or trust deed for the
financing of said off-site improvements shall not be an amount
to exceed the engineer's estimated cost in accordance with bids
received from reliable contractors for the construction of such
improvements, and provided Trustee shall be immediately reconveyed
all of the subject property herein after the execution and
recordation of any such trust deed or mortgage executed by
obligation or encumbrance. It is fully understood and agreed,
however, that Trustee will assume no obligation nor liability
for the repayment of any such loan, and that ail such loan proceeds shall be under the control of a reliable lending institution
to insure compliance that such funds are expended solely for the
purpose of the construction of the required off-site improvements,
and for no other purpose. Seller, Buyer and Escrow-Trustee shall
have the right, upon request, to have an audit of expenditures of
all such loan proceeds. Such off-site improvements may include
engineering, road, water system, sewer, curb and gutter, sidewalk,
storm sewer and land fill.
c. Neither Seller nor Escrow Holder-Trustee shall
be under any obligation to incur any expense in connection with
the planning, laying out, approval or development of the subject
property, and Buyer agrees to hold Seller and Escrow Holder-Trusted
harmless from any liability in connection with such development.
Neither Escrow Holder-Trustee nor Seller are in any way engaged
in the selling of any lots or improved property hereunder, and
that this transaction is the sale by the Seller to Buyer of
unimproved acreage for such development purposes as the Buyer
may elect to utilize the same.
d. Seller hereby authorizes, empowers and instructs
the Escrow Holder-Trustee, if requested by Buyer, to execute all
documents reasonably necessary to subdivide, plat, and improve
|
the subject property or to annex said property or any portion
thereof to an adjacent municipality or any water, sewer, or other
improvement district as may be necessary or convenient, provided
that nothing herein shall require the Escrow Holder-Trustee, or
j
Seller, to furnish any bonds or other obligation in connection
with any such development, annexation, subdivision, or the
installation of any improvements upon any of the subject property.
5. Buyer hereby acknowledges that it has inspected
the premises purchased hereunder, and that it is familiar with
the locution, condition and terrain thereof; that said property
is sold hereunder on an "as is" basis only. The Seller hereby
j
expressly disclaims any and all warranties and representations,
express or implied, as to the state of the property, its condition, quality, character, or suitability or fitness for any sue,
whether existing or contemplated, matters of zoning, or in other j
respect.
i

*-tt

6. Seller agrees tnat after receipt of the down payment
Hereinabove provided for, that they will release lots to Buyer
for all subsequent principal payments at tne rate of one lot for
every prorata percentage of principal received from Buyer, said
prorata percentage to oe determined by dividing the principal
balance due DV the number of lots ODtamed in the subdivision.
For example, if fifty (50) lots were obtained in the subdivision
and the balance due was $335,880.00, Seller would release to
Buyer one lot for every $6,717.60 of principal received (not
counting the $75,000.00 down payment). ($335,880.00 divided
Dy 50 equals $6,717.60.)
7. Taxes shall be prorated as of the date of final
contract of sale. Taxes after 1979 shall be paid by Buyer.
8. Seller warrants that there are no liens or encumorances on the property hereinabove described and agrees to
furnish to Buyer at Seller's expense a title policy showing
good and marketable title in said property (said title policy to
oe furnished at tne time of tne receipt of down payment from
3uyer). Further, Seller agrees to execute and deliver to Buyer,
or assigns, good and sufficient warranty aeeds covering t-tle to
tne above described property when subdivided and as paid for in
accordance with the terms hereinabove set out.
9. In tne event of a failure to comply with the terms
hereof by the 3uyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make any
payment or payments wnen the same shall become due, or within
thirty (30) days tnereafter, tne Seller, at his option snail have
the following alternative remedies:
h 4
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b. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment
for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall
not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to one of
the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default)
or
c. The Seller shall have the right, at his option,
and upon written notice to tne Buyer, to declare the entire
unpaid balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect
to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to
the 3uyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose
the same in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and
have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment
of the balance owing, including costs and attorney's fees; and
the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may

3

-4remam. In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upcn
the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to tne
appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged
property and collect the rents, issues and profits therefrom and
apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or
hold the same pursuant to order of the court; and the Seller,
upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the
possession
of the said premises during the period of redemption.
10.

It is agreed that time is the essence of this

agreement.
11. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances
against said premises other than those herein provided for or
referred to, or m the event any liens or encumbrances other
m a n herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against tne same
by act.s or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his
option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit on the
amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such
payment or payments and thereafter the payments herein provided
to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer/ be suspended until
such a time as such suspended payments shall equal any sums
advanced as aforesaid.
12. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they
default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein,
that the defaulting party shall pay ail costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue
from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the
premises covered hereby, or m pursuing any remedy provided
hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah wnether such
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise.
13. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid
are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators,
successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement
have hereunto signed their names, the day and year first above
written.

SCHEDULE A
PARCEL 1 :
,_
Beginning at the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter
cf -ne Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running thence
East 238 feet, thence North 900 feet, more or less, to the center
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said centerlme to a
point North of beginning, thence South 930 feet, more or less,
to the place of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 2:
Deginnmq at a point 763 feet Eastr of the Southwest corner of
the Nortnwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Running thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet, more
or less, to the centerlme of Combe Road; thence Northwesterly
along said centerlme to a point North of beginning; thence
South 750 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
Containing 2.75 acres.
PARCEL 3:
Beginning at a point 937.36 feet East of the Southwest corner
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S.
Survey; running thence East 60.73 feet; thence Northeasterly
to a point on the center of Combe Road, said point oeing East
197.88 feet and North 0°04,30" West 571.02 feet to the centerline of Combe Road and Northwesterly along said centerlme
15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centerlme of said road to
a point North of beginning; thence South 625 feet to the place
of beginning.
PARCEL 4:
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest corner
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 250 feet, thence North
835 feet, more or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence
Northwesterly along said centerlme to a point North of
beginning; tnence South 900 feet, more or less, to the place
jof beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less.
J PARCEL 5:
.Beginning 488 feet East of the Southwest corner of the
• Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
and running thence East 275 feet, thence North 750 feet,
, more or less, to the center of the County Road, thence North1
westerly along the center of said County Road to a point
North 835 feet, more or less, from tne point of beginning,
thence South 835 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
Containing 3.40 acres.
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AMENDMENT TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
This Amendment is made this £ V — day of November, 1982,
by and between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee

(hereinafter

designated as "Sellers") and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M.
HARRISON of Fullerton, California

(hereinafter designated as

"Buyers").
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated
December 29, 197 9 for the sale of property as described in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined

m

Paragraph 1 of said Contract as follows:
"Buyers shall pay to Sellers interest only for
the first six (6) years of this Contract, payable on
the 31st day of December, beginning on December 31,
1980.

On December 31, 1985, Sellers shall pay the

balance of the purchase price, principal and interest
in full."
Except for the above Amendment, all other terms and conditions of the Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979
shall remain the same and ir full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have
hereunto signed their names on the day and year first-above
written.
SELLERS:
m

^/G v»

L

uHrzcLc
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EVELYN COMBE
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.
By:
S e c u r i t y T i t l e Company
o f ChgAen a s E s c r o w
HoWr-Trustee

BUYERS:
/^PG-M&A

CASPER J. BR5UER

(

*
j

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

)/TJ£XAJL/X.

This agreement is made this 3rd day cf January 19 81-, by
and between Keith p. Combe and Evelyn Combe, his Wife, and First
Security Bank, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter designated
as "Sellers") and Casper J. Breuer and William M. Harrison of
Fullerton, California (hereinafter Gesignated as "Buyers").
This Agreement amends the terms of the Real Estate Contract
dated December 29, 1979 for the sale
property described in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
This agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined in
Paragraph 1 of said contract as follows:
For the period Dec. 31, 1981 to Dec. 31, 1982, Seller is
owed $35,267.4 0 in interest. Seller agrees, for this period only,
to accept a payment of $17,633.71 (one-half of the amount due)
and to defer the payment of the balance, $17,633.71, until July 1,
1983. The deferred amount shall accrue interest at the rate of
TEN AND ONE-HALF (10 1/2%) PERCENT per annum.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have
hereunto signed their names on the day and year first-above
written.
SELLERS:
J->~

- A ,- / j

KEITH

y.

.,-

P.COMBE

L - H . U ; Vv

v
'v -?": c : S--

EVELYN COMBE
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.
By: ^Sec-ardty T±t±c Company

BUYERS
CASPER Ji BREUER^,
/

WILLIAM M. HARRISON

f*
J
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AMEMESNT TO REAL ESTATE CDNTKAIT
This Amendment is made this -y> ^'vday of February, 1934 by and
between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and FIRST SECURITY
BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter designated as "Sellers")
and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. HARRISON of Fullerton, California
(hereinafter designated as "Buyers").
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated December 29,
1979 for the sale of property as described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined in Paragraph
#1 of said Contract as follows:
"Buyers shall pay to Sellers interest only for the
first six (6) years of this Contract, payable on
the 31st day of December, beginning on December 31,
1980. On December 31, 1985, Sellers shall pay the
balance of the purchase price, principal and interest
in full. Seller does agree that when $120,000.00 or more
is paid towards the principle during the contract period,
that seller will extend the contract maturity date until
December 31, 1988. Seller will accept the principle
amount stated above in a lump sum payment or in aggregrate payments that will total that amount or more."
Except for the above Amendment, all other terms and conditions of .the

/?

r/^

,au// ttii,a au,( act <u*sii&x&u-t>i4r&**^
Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979/shall remain'the same and
in full force and effect.

^
/%{'*

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have hereunto
signed their names on the day and year first-above written.
SELLERS:

EVELYN COMBE
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.

BUYERS^

^

CASPER JiJ BREUER'

tfilliAM

M. IIP

iM PLAINTIFFS

1

fiffT 1

AMENDMENT TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACT

This Amendment is made this _* l:" day of February, 1984
by and between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and
FIRST

SECURITY

designated
HARRISON

BANK, N.A.,

Ogden, Utah, Trustee

(hereinafter

as "Sellers") and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M.
of

Fullerton,

California

(hereinafter

designated

as

"Buyers").
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated
December 29, 1979 for the sale of property as described in Exhibit
"A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined
in Paragraph #6 of said Contract as follows:
"Buyer and Seller understand that a condominium
developement

is going to be constructed

on the West

15 acres of the property, i.e., the west portion of
Skyline Drive.

The development will contain

approximately 90 condos to be constructed in 6 phases.
The first phase will contain 14 units on approximately
2V2 acres.

The second

phase will contain 12 units

on approximately 2V2 acres. As each unit sells and closes
the

seller

($335,880

will
- 90).

receive

$3732.00

principle

payment.

Seller agrees to subordinate the

initial 2V2 acres of ground needed in the first phase
to a construction and development loan, the proceeds
of which shall be strictly applied to improvements to
the property.
subordinate

Seller may thereafter agree to
additional

parcels

of

ground

upon

further terms and conditions as the parties may
thereafter agree.

such

Page 2
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Except for the above Amendment, and < the Amendment dated * ^ .
~>i (j;

day

of

February,

1984, all

other

terms

and

conditions

of the Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979, shall remain
the same and in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have
hereunto signed their names on the day and year first-above
written.

SELLERS:

(Z^L
EVELYN COMBE

BUYERS:

^CASPER J. BRfitt£fc;

, ///j/imi M/dmt77?/
WILLIAM M. HARRISON

7
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TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC.

N>:

£>x

TW Lawym' OrfBBixatto* It \mmt\mt Thk» |«fccalErta*

Denver, Colorado

V

&>>:
& = > ' • •

Robert E. Froerer
Issued By.
(Member's Name)
536 24th Street, Suite 2B

'&>•'

b>"<
£>X

(Address)
Ogden, Utah
84401

POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE
OWNERS

'4*

£-!!•:

r=>x

SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE
B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, Attorneys' Title
Guaranty Fund, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy
shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule
A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder,
sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of:
3-

1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein;
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title;
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land;
4. Unmarketability of such title.

£=>:•:

wy
£> *
Mx
£=>'•
&>x
$>y

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Company has caused this Policy to be signed and sealed, to be valid when
Schedule A is countersigned by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its
By-Laws.

&> i
ATTEST:

A T T O R N E Y S ' TITLE G U A R A N T Y F U N D . INC.
\

^JC/cl^

\^^ A<2>

lilsEAL};)

Fletcher Thomas. Secretary

BY

l/[Lvr^

HJ, J £ / R / ^

¥%*
&y*' *

Wifford W Kirton. Jr.. President

IP
<£> >-

This policy must contain Schedules A and B
duly validated by this signature:
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TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC.
COVERAGE SAME AS A L T A OWNERS POLICY. FORM B 1970 AMENDED 10-17-70
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy
1 Any law ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances)
restricting or regulating or prohibiting the occupancy use or enjoyment of the land or regulating the character,
dimensions or location of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in
ownership or a reduction in the dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law,
ordinance or governmental regulation
2 Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police powerunlessnoticeof the exercise of such rights appears in the public records at Date of Policy
3 Defects liens encumbrances adverse claims or other matters (a) created suffered assumed or agreed to by
the insured claimant (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the insured claimant either at Date of Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estale or interest insured by
this policy and not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured
claimant became an insured hereunder, (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant, (d) attaching
or created subsequent to Date of Policy or (e) resultinq in loss or damage which would not have been sustained
if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
Definition of Term*
The following terms when used in th s policy mean
(a) insured the insured named «r Schedule A and subiect to any rights or
tenses the Company may have had against the named insured those who
cceed to the interest of such n S ured bv operation of law as distmqutshed from
irchase mciudmq but not hrr ted to he rs distributees devisees sjrvivors
rsonai representatives next of km or corporate or fiduciary successors
lb) insured claimant an insured eta mmg loss or darraoe hereunoe f
<o knowledge actjai knowieooe not constructive fcnowiedoe or notice
nch may be imputed to an insured by reason of any public records
(d) land the land described specifically or by reference m Schedule A and
provements affixed thereto which by Jaw constitute reai property provided
>wever the term land does not include any property beyonc the lines of the
ea specifically described or re^errea to in Schedule A nor any right title
teres! estate or easement ir abutting sheets roads avenues alleys lanes ways
waterways but no*hi no herein shai modify or limit the extent to which a right of
cess to and I'om the land is insured by this policy
(e) mortgage
mortgage deed of trust trust deed or otne» security
Strument
(f) public records those records which by law impart constructive notice of
atters relating to said land
Continuation of Intursnce after Conveyance of Title
Thecoveraoeof thispo icy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy m favor of
i insured so tona assucn nsured ret a ns an estate or interest m the and or holds
) indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given by a purchaser
Dm such insured or so long as such insured shall have liability by reason of
>venants of warranty made by such insured in any transfer or conveyance of
ich estate or interest provided howe/er this policy shall not continue in force in
vor o* a n / purchaser from such insured of either said estate or interest or the
debtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured
Defense and Prosecution of Actions — Notice of Claim to be Given by an
Insured Claimant
(ai The Company at its own cost and without undue delay shall provide for the
»fense of an insured m all litigation consisting of actions or proceedings
jmmenced agamst such insured to the extent that such litigation is founded
Don an alleged defect hen encumbrance or other matter insured against by this
Dlicy

(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing (i) in case any
action or proceed • is beoun as set forth m |a) above (n) mease knowledge shall
ereunoer of any claim of titie or interest which is adverse to
come to an insure
the title totheestc 'v interest as insured and which miQht cause loss or damage
~y may be liable by virtue of this policy If such prompt notice
for which the Corr
sha'i no' be Q**er - the Company then as to such insuredr all liability of the
e
and terminate m reqard to the maMer o matters for which
Company sha I ce
such prompt no' Cf s required provided however that fa jre to notify shaiim no
case prejudice tne nqhts of any such insured unoer tn s policy unless the
Company shall be prejudiced by such failure and then only to the extent of such
prejudice
tc) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute and without
undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any other act which m its
opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish the titietothe estate or interest
as insured and the Company may take any appropriate action under the terms of
this policy whether or not it shall be liable thereunder and shall not thereby
concede liability or waive any provision of this policy
(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or interposed a
defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this policy the Company
may pursue any such litigation to tina. determination by a court of competent
jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right in its sole discretion to appeal from
any adverse judgment or order
(e) In all cases where this policy permits or requires the Company to prosecute
or provide tor the defense of any action or proceeding the insured hereunder shall
secure to the Company the right to so prosecute or provide defense in such action
or proceeding and at appeals therein and permit the Company to use at its
option the name of such insured for such purpose Whenever requested by the
Company such insured shall give the Company all reasonable aid in any such
action or proceeding in effecting settlement securing evidence obtaining
witnesses or prosecuting or defending such action or proceeding and the
Company shall reimburse such insured tor any expense so incurred
4 Notice of Lot*—Limitation of Action
In addition to the notices required under paragraph 3 (b) of these Conditions
and Stipulations a statement in writing of any loss or damage for which it is
claimed the Company is liable under this policy shall be furnished to the Company
within 90 days after such loss or damage shall have been determined and no right
of action shall accrue to an insured claimant until 30 days after such statement
shall hjve been furnished Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage
shall terminate any liability of the Company under this policy as to such loss or
damage

Continued on cover sheet

AMOUNT

POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE

DATE OF POLICY

SCHEDULE A
y 410,880.00
N A M E OF INSURED
The Equitable Estate created by a Uniform Real Estate Contract
dated January 9, 1980, executed by KEITH P. COMBE, and EVELYN COMBE,
his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee, as
Seller, and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. HARRISON, as Buyer.
Premium S

November
8;24
mt

14

'

1980

o'clock—h.—M.

176?. SO

3. The estate OT interest in the land described herein and which is covered by this policy is:
An i n t e r e s t pursuant t o t h a t c e r t a i n Uniform Real Estate Contract dated January 9, 1980,
by and between KEITH P. CttBE and EVELYN, h i s wife, and FIRST SECURITY EANK N.A., Trustee,
2 The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested inrjas S e l l e r , and CASPER J , BREUER
Parcels #1 thru #4: Keith P. Ccribe and Evelyn Ccrtibe
j and WILLIAM M. HARRISCN, as
Parcel #5: F i r s t Security Bank N.A., Trustee, and Keith P. Combe and Evelyn.
| Buyer,
3. The land referred to in this Policy is situate in the County of
WEBER
'
State of Utah, and is described as follows:

(SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE A)

countersigned: R o b e r t E . F r o e r e r
Issued at:.

Ogden, Weber County, Utah

Autbon**d Officer or Agent

policy oN°THIS POLICY VALID ONLY IF SCHEDULE B IS ATTACHED

14509

ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC.
Coverage sarr>« B*
ALTA O w n e r ' * Policy

Form B 1970 Amended 10-17-70

SCHEDULE

W A H (Owner's) 51C

B

This policy does not insure against loss by reason of the following:
PART ONE: This part of Schedule B refers to matters which, if any such exist, may affect the title to said land, but which
are not shown in this policy:
1. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing agency or by the public records, and casements, liens or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records.
2. Rights or claims of persons in possession of said land which arc not shown by the public records.
3. Any facts, rights, interest, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by an
inspection of said land, or by making inquiry ol persons in possession thereof, or by a correct survey.
4. M nine claims, reservations in patents, water rights, claims or title to water.
5. Proceedings for municipal improvement, which, at the date hereof, are shown by the official records of any such city,
but have not resulted in the imposition of a lien upon, or establishment of an easement over, or adjudication of the
right to a public use of said land or any part thereof.
PART TV.'O This part of Schedule B shows liens, encumbianccs. defects and other matters affecting the title to said land
D: to \shich SUJU title is subject:

Taxes for year 1980 are a lien, not yet due. Tax I.D. numbers: #1, 07-086-0033;
#2, 07-086-0039; #3, 07-086-0040; #4, 07-086-0034; #5, 07-086-0016.
Property is subject to easements to the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
as described by document recorded in Book 1267, page 281 in the records? of Vfeber County.
Property is within the boundaries of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, and the
Unitah Highlands Sewer Improvement District, and is subject to any and all assessments
levied by said districts.
Unrecorded Real Estate Contract dated January 9, 1980, by and between KEITH P. COMBE
and EVELYN COMBE, his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Trustee, as Seller, and
CASPER J. BREUER, and WILLIAM M. HARRISON, as Buyer.
The Company shall assume no liability under this policy to the extent that loss or
damage arises fran failure to record the instalment or instruments necessary to
evidence the estate or interest covered by this policy.
Right of Trustee or Receiver in the even of bankruptcy, receivership or insolvency
of the Seller to repudiate the Contract.
This policy does not insure or guarantee performance by the Seller, his heirs,
successors and assigns, under the Terms of the Contract.
Property taxes for 1978 and 1979 are a lien on Parcel #1 and Parcel #4. Amount due
on Parcel #1: $581.30 for 1978, $552.59 for 1979. Arcount due on Parcel #4: $581.30
1978 and $552.59 for 1979.

:ountcrsigncd: Robert E. Froerer

Aut&onzed Officer or Agent

POLICY SERIAL NO. O-

14509

The typed serial number above MUST be the same
as the printed serial number on Schedule A.

SCHEDULE A

PARCEL 1:
bcgTnnTng at the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running thence
I East 238 feet, thence North 900 feet, more or less, to the center
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said centerline to a
[J point North of beginning, thence South 930 feet, more or less,
I to the place of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 2:
P beg inning at a point 763 feet East of the Southwest corner of
I the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Running thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet, more
I or less, to the centerline of Combe Road; thence Northwesterly
along said centerline to a point North of beginning; thence
| South 750 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
Containing 2.75 acres.
If
I
I
I
I
j.
|
j;
j

P A R C E L 3:
b e g i n n i n g at a p o i n t 9 3 7 . 3 6 f e e t E a s t o f t h e S o u t h w e s t c o r n e r
of the N o r t h w e s t Q u a r t e r of the N o r t h w e s t Q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U . S .
Survey; running thence East 60.73 feet; thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y
to a p o i n t o n t h e c e n t e r o f C o m b e R o a d , s a i d p o i n t b e i n g E a s t
197.88 feet and N o r t h O # O 4 f 3 0 ' W e s t 5 7 1 . 0 2 feet to the c e n t e r l i n e of C o m b e R o a d a n d N o r t h w e s t e r l y a l o n g s a i d c e n t e r l i n e

li 15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centerline of said road to
li a point North of beginning; thence South 625 feet to the place
I] of beg inning .
I ^ A p CEL < :
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest corner
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section
I 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
li U.S. Survey; and running thence East 250 feet, thence North
•| 835 feet, more or less, to tho center of Combe Road, thence
v Northwesterly along said centerline to a point North of
jj beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or less, to the place
I of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less.

II PARCEL 5:
I beginning 498 feet East of the Southwest corner of the
.Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
;Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
jand running thence East 275 feet, thence North 750 feet,
: more or less, to the center of the County Road, thence Northjwesterly along the center of said County Road to a point
''North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of beginning,
! thence South 835 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS—CONTINUED
pttoni to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims
ie Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle tor or m the name
insured claimant any claim insured agamst or to terminate all liability and
ations ot the Company hereunder by paying or tendering payment ot the
mt of insurance under this policy together withany costs attorneys feesand
^ses incurred up to the t me Of Sucn payment or tender of payment by the
?d claimant and authorized by the Company
termination and Payment of Lots
>e hab iity of the Company unoer this policy shall in nocaseexceed the least
tne actual loss of the insured claimant or
tre amount o' insurance stated in Schedule A
he Company wilt pay in addition to any loss insured agamst by this policy a!'
•mposec upon an insured m litigation earned on by the Company for such
>C and an costs attorneys fees ana expenses in litigation earned on by such
»0 with the written authorization of the Company
'hen i ability has been definitely fixed in accordance with the conditions of
oiicy the loss or damage shall be payable withm 30 days thereafter
station of Liability
a ~ s*~a ar sr o'DF ma nta rar * n a c tn.s poi«cv ia>'tthe Company atte'
3 received notice of an alleged defect i»en or encumbrance insured agamst
r.der by I'tiaation or otherwise removes such detect hen or encumbrance
at s^es me t *ie as msjred * *n r a reasonable time atter receipt of such
(b) m me even* of litigation until there has been a final determination by a
D* competent )u f sdict on and 0 sposition of all appeals therelrorr adverse
tttie as insurer as provided m paragraph 3 hereof or (c) for liability
amy assumed by an insured in settling any claim or suit without prior written
nt of the Company
uction of Liability
payments under this policy except payments made tor costs attorneys
TO expenses shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro tanto No
nt shall be made without producing this policy for endorsement of such
nt un.ess the policy be lost or destroyed in which case proof of such loss or
:t.on shall be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company
>lllty Noncumulativt
expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall
uced by anv amount the Company may pay under any policy insuring either
longage shown or referred to in Schedule B hereof which is a lien on the
or m'erest covered by this policy or (b) a mortgage hereafter executed by
jred which is a charge or lien on the estate or interest described or referred
ched j i e A and the amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this
The Company shall have the option to apply to the payment of any such
iges any amount that otherwise would be payable hereunderto the insured
of the estate or interest covered by this policy and the amount sopaid shall

be deemed a payment under this policy to said insured owner
10 Apportionment
2
if the land described m Schedule A consists of two or more parcels which are
not used as a single site and a loss is established affecting one or more of said
parcels but not an the loss shall be computed and settled on a pro rata basts as if
the amount of insurance under this policy was divided pro rata as to the va ue
on Date of Pohcv o4 each separate parcel to the who'e exclusive of any irn
provements made subseauent to Date of Policy unless a lability or value has
otherwise been agreed upon as to each such parcel by the Company and the
insured at the time of the issuance of this policy and shown by an express
statement herein or by an endorsement attached hereto
11 Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement
Whenever the Company shai' have settled a claim under this policy all right o f
subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of the insured
claimant The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to all rights ano
remedies which such insured claimant would have had agamst any person or
property in respect to such claim had this policy not been issued and if requested
by the Company such insured claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights
and remedies agamst any person or property necessary in order to perfect such
right of subrogation and shall permit the Company to use the name of such
insured claimant in any transaction or litigation involving such nghtsor remedies
It the payment does not co*er the loss of such insured claimant the Company
shall be subrogated to such rights and remedies in the proportion which sa.d
payment bears to the amount of said loss If loss should result t-om any act of such
insured claimant such act shall not void this policy but the Company in that
event shall be required to pay only that pan of any losses insured agamst
hereunder which shall exceed the amount if any lost to the Company by reason of
the impairment of the right of subrogation
12 Liability Limited to this Policy
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments if any
attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and contract between the
insured and the Company
Any claim of loss or damage whether or not based on negligence and which
arises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or any
action asserting such claim shall be restricted to the provisions and conditions
and stipulations of this policy
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President a Vice
President the Secretary and Assistant Secretary or validating officer or
authorized signatory of the Company
13. Notices. Where Sent
All notices required to be given the Company and any statement in writing
required to be furnished the Company shall be addressed to its Home Office

THIS POLICY IS NOT TRANSFERABLE TO SUBSEQUENT OWNERS A REISSUE POLICY IN FAVOR OF NEW PURCHASERS SHOULD BE OBTAINED
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 'SifAttfeftQ&a
BRUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J . BREUER and WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,
Plaintiffs,

RULING ON MOTIONS

vs.

KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, and
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
Trustee,

Case No.

90135

Case No.

90793

Defendants.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
and FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for
PHILIP COMBE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASPER J. BREUER and
WILLIAM M. HARRISON,
Defendants.

The

parties

entered

into

a

Real

Estate

Contract,

Paragraph 8 of which states, "Seller warrants that there are no
liens or encumbrances on the property herein above described, and
agrees to furnish to Buyer, at Sellers expense, a title policy
showing good and marketable title in said property

(said title

policy to be furnished at the time of the receipt of down payment

Page 2
Ruling on Motions
Case No. 90135

from Buyer).

Furtherf Seller agrees to execute and deliver to

Buyer, or assigns, good and sufficient warranty deeds covering
title to the above described property when subdivided and as paid
for in accordance with the terms hereinabove set out."1
(In regard to the sellers claim that Paragraph 5 makes
it an "as is" sale, without warranties, I hold that Paragraph 5
is speaking of the physical condition of the property, and has
nothing to do with the warranties of title as set out Paragraph
8.)

The original contract was dated January 9, 1980.

It was

amended four times, but at no time was Paragraph 8 altered and
the amendments stated and all other terms and conditions shall
remain the same.
It turns out that there is a 30

foot wide

easement

traversing the property diagonally in a northwest direction and
in the easement is an irrigation aqueduct of substantial size.
The easement is not listed in the Real Estate Contract as an
exception to Paragraph 8.
There is argument between the parties as to when the
buyers knew of the easement; sellers claiming they knew all along
and buyers claiming they knew sometime in 1983.

The buyers claim

that the sellers committed an anticipatory breach of contract, in
that they are now and will always be unable to supply a warranty
deed free of the easement.

The sellers make no claim that they

can relieve the property of the easement by having the pipeline

A

^^
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changed.

Admittedlyf

their contract.

they cannot comply with Paragraph

8 of

I find that the doctrine of anticipatory breach

is applicable in this casef as the sellers are unable to perform
their

obligation

unencumbered
easement

under

title

is not

the

contract

to the buyers.

a minor

to convey

I further

inconvenience, but

fee simple,

find

that the

is a substantial

encumbrance to fee title.
I further find that waiver is not a defense to their
inability to perform.
There are various remedies for anticipatory breach, and
the buyer is not required to immediately make an election or be
held to waive his right to rescind the contract.

The purchaser

is entitled to a deed which conveys the fee simple title to the
land without the easement and is not required to accept a defective title.

The Glasmann case cited by both parties, which has

stood for 80 years, rather hits the nail on the head, wherein it
states, "The respondent contracted to furnish a good title, and
the fact that he was unable to do so is his misfortune, and not
the fault of the appellant."
The contract being subject to rescission, the buyer may
be entitled to some refund of payments.

If the parties cannot

arrive at an agreement between themselves, they are instructed to
contact

the

calendar

clerk

and

have

the

matter

set

for

an

evidentiary hearing.

476
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The

buyers1

motion

for

summary

ruling

granting

judgment

seeking

rescission is granted.
Whereas

the

summary

judgment

for

rescission ends the contract between the parties, the sellers
action for foreclosure falls of its own weight.

The buyers1

motion for summary judgment dismissing the sellers complaint for
foreclosure is granted.
The buyers1 counsel to prepare findings, conclusions and
judgment in accordance herewith.
DATED this

l rf day of March, 1986.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
true and

I 1 day of March, 1986, a

correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motions was

served upon the following:
Jack L. Schoenhals
Attorney for Bruer-Harrison
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Erik Strindberg
Attorney for Defendants Combe
424 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Ann

James Z. Davis
Attorney for Defendant First Security Bank
1020 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah 84401
David C. West
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
Jeffry R. Burton
2606 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

JwsJ?
PAULA CARRf Secretary

TabF

Jack L. Schoenhals #2881
Attorney for Plaintiff
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-8823

U'Tsr-* /-V. :: .\ L ^ r

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
\

BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
#

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 90135
vs.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT A. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, AND
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE,
Defendants.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, AS TRUSTEE FOR
PHILIP COMBE,

Civil No. 90793

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASPER J. BREUER AND
WILLIAM M. HARRISON,
Defendants.

The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d matter came on r e g u l a r l y for hearing
before

t h e H o n o r a b l e Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the Judges of

n

the
of

above-entitled
December,

were

Defendants,
represented
Froerer,

Keith
by

P.

John

was

First

the

J.

Breuer

by

Jack

Combe

and

Ashton,

the

matter

represented

Security

Court

Memorandums
same

Casper

represented

Fund

Defendant

this

Inc.,

L.

Plaintiffs,

a n d W i l l i a m M.

Schoenhals,

Evelyn

by

Robert

West,

E.

Title

and

the

Bank was r e p r e s e n t e d by James Z.

having

reviewed the f i l e s

and r e c o r d s

and h a v i n g h e a r d a r g u m e n t of c o u n s e l and
submitted

were

t h e Defendant

David

the

Combe,

Defendant,

was n o t p r e s e n t or r e p r e s e n t e d ,

Guaranty

Davis,

i n h i s c o u r t r o o m on t h e 1 9 t h day

1 9 8 5 , a t t h e hour of 2:00 p . m . , t h e

Breuer-Harrison ,
Harrison,

Court,

in

having

t o t h e C o u r t and h a v i n g r e v i e w e d

the

and h a v i n g e n t e r e d i t s R u l i n g on M o t i o n s , now makes and

enters the

following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Casper

buyers;
Bank,

2.

Breuer

and

Trustee,

as s e l l e r s ,

d a t e d J a n u a r y 9,

M.

Harrison,

Pursuant

entered

Security

into a real

estate

t o t h e t e r m s of t h e r e a l e s t a t e

contract,

$75,000.00.

Art—fche-tiTme of t h e p u r c h a s e of t h e p r o p e r t y and

ex-e-e-trtrrrnT~bf

as

1980.

t h e b u y e r s made a down payment of
3.

William

and K e i t h P . Combe, E v e l y n Combe, and F i r s t

N.A. ,

contract

J.

the real e s t a t e contract,

-2-

the s e l l e r s paid

the
for

a policy

of

t i t l e i n s u r a n c e , which was i s s u e d t o t h e buyers

as i n s u r e d s .
4.

The b u y e r s

amendments
terms

and

to

the

real

estate

entered

amendments

to

the

8 of

amendments
conditions

the

real

the

of

the

buyers

and

estate

real

provided

The r e a l

execute

".

s e l l e r s entered

contract,

estate

that

real

7.
the

estate

and d e l i v e r

sufficient

to

a t no time was

c o n t r a c t a l t e r e d and t h e
.

. all

other

terms

the

and

e s t a t e c o n t r a c t dated December 29,
effect."

c o n t r a c t requires the s e l l e r s to
the

buyers

or

a s s i g n s , good and

There

is

a 30 f o o t

wide easement which t r a v e r s e s

d i a g o n a l l y in a northwest d i r e c t i o n and w i t h i n

t h a t easement i s an i r r i g a t i o n aquaduct of s u b s t a n t i a l

in

into

warranty deeds covering t i t l e of t h e p r o p e r t y .

property

8.

four

c o n t r a c t which a l t e r e d t h e

1979 s h a l l remain t h e same and in f u l l f o r c e and
6.

into

contract.

Even t h o u g h

paragraph

sellers

c o n d i t i o n s of the payments due under the terms of

the real e s t a t e
5.

and t h e

The easement and t h e aquaduct are n e i t h e r
real

obligations

size.

described

estate

c o n t r a c t nor a r e they excepted from t h e

of

sellers

the

to

convey good and

sufficient

w a r r a n t y deeds f r e e and c l e a r of l i e n s and encumbrances.

-3-

9.
not
in

The e x i s t e n c e of t h e easement and t h e aquaduct were

disclosed

by t h e s e l l e r s t o t h e b u y e r s , were not noted

t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , or shown as an e x c e p t i o n in t h e

p o l i c y of t i t l e
10.

In

insurance issued to the buyers.
the

first

part

of

the

year

1983,

Combes

d i s c l o s e d the e x i s t e n c e of t h e easement t o t h e b u y e r s 1 agent
at

which

time

a new t i t l e

report

was p r e s e n t e d

t o the

b u y e r s 1 agent which d i s c l o s e d t h e e x i s t e n c e of the easement.
11.
which

There i s a d i s p u t e of f a c t as t o t h e e x a c t d a t e at

the

buyers

became

aware

of

the

existence

of

the

easement and became aware of t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e aquaduct.
12.
the

P a r a g r a p h 5 of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t

containing

p h r a s e "as i s " p e r t a i n s t o t h e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of the

property

and has nothing t o do with t h e w a r r a n t i e s of

which

are

estate

contract.

13.
relieve

dealt

w i t h s e p a r a t e l y in paragraph 8 of t h e r e a l

The s e l l e r s
the

title

property

have
of

made no c l a i m

that

t h e y can

t h e easement and/or t h a t they can

have t h e p i p e l i n e removed from t h e p r o p e r t y .
14.
real

The s e l l e r s cannot comply with paragraph 8 of t h e

estate

contract

and c a n n o t convey t i t l e t o t h e r e a l

p r o p e r t y f r e e and c l e a r of t h e easement and t h e a q u a d u c t .

-4-

15.
not

The e x i s t e n c e of t h e easement and t h e aquaduct

a minor

inconvenience

but

is

instead

a

is

substantial

encumbrance t o t h e fee t i t l e t o t h e p r o p e r t y .
16.
the

The s e l l e r s were not o b l i g a t e d t o convey t i t l e

buyers

to

u n t i l t h e buyers made payment of the balance due

in f u l l t o t h e s e l l e r s .
17.

At no t i m e ,

hearing

of

this

balance

of

the

up t o and i n c l u d i n g t h e d a t e of t h e

motion,

did

contract

t h e buyers t e n d e r t h e e n t i r e

and demand conveyance of the fee

simple t i t l e .
18.
terms
fee

The s e l l e r s ,

of

the

title

real

because they cannot comply with t h e

estate

to the

c o n t r a c t and convey unencumbered

property,

a r e g u i l t y of an a n t i c i p a t o r y

breach of t h e c o n t r a c t .
19.
under

Since

the

convey

fee

easement
further
estate

of

title,

the

Real

Estate

obligation

C o n t r a c t and cannot

by w a r r a n t y deed, f r e e and c l e a r of t h e

and a q u a d u c t ,
obligation

the

to

buyers

are

relieved

of any

perform under t h e terms of t h e r e a l

contract.

20.
which

terms

t h e s e l l e r s cannot perform t h e i r

There

indicates

anticipatory

is

no c o n d u c t

that

breach

the
as

on t h e

buyers

part

elected

of t h e buyers
to

treat

the

a breach of t h e c o n t r a c t u n t i l t h e
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buyers

filed

l e g a l a c t i o n and a l l e g e d t h a t t h e s e l l e r s were

g u i l t y of an a n t i c i p a t o r y
21.

The b u y e r s

substantial
their
the

period

made a s u b s t a n t i a l
of

effort,

over a

t i m e , t o see if they could m i t i g a t e

damages and/or m i t i g a t e t h e impact of t h e easement and

aquaduct

hired

breach.

upon t h e

property,

and in t h i s r e g a r d ,

t h e s e r v i c e s of v a r i o u s e n g i n e e r s and examined

alternative

methods

of

they

several

d e v e l o p i n g t h e p r o p e r t y around t h e

easement and t h e a q u a d u c t .
22.
easement

The buyers became aware, t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e
and t h e

aquaduct

i n t e r f e r e d with t h e i r

proposed

development of t h e p r o p e r t y .
23.
maps

The easement was not shown on any s k e t c h e s or p l a t

given

to

the

buyers

prior

to

the

time

that

they

purchased t h e p r o p e r t y .
24.

The f i r s t

drawings

prepared

new t i t l e

report

time

the

easement

was shown

on any

by Great Basin Engineering was a f t e r
was g i v e n

the

by t h e s e l l e r s t o t h e b u y e r s 1

agent in 1983.
25.
condition

The r e a l
as

it

property

remains

in t h e same p h y s i c a l

was when t h e o r i g i n a l r e a l e s t a t e

was executed between t h e buyers and t h e s e l l e r s .
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contract

26.

The b u y e r s

anticipatory
contract.

A f t e r t h e buyers made t h e i r e l e c t i o n t o claim an
breach

filing

action,

their

e l e c t i o n t o claim an

b r e a c h of the c o n t r a c t , a n d / o r t o r e s c i n d t h e

anticipatory
legal

engaged

made a t i m e l y

in

and/or

rescind

the

c o n t r a c t , by

t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t t h e buyers

any c o n d u c t

right

to

to e l e c t

which could c o n s t i t u t e a waiver of

to

act

upon the a n t i c i p a t o r y breach

and/or t o r e s c i n d t h e c o n t r a c t .
27.
sellers

The

question

arrive

amount

to

refund

will

be

at

refund

to

have

court

be
If

paid

by t h e

the

parties

an a g r e e m e n t between t h e m s e l v e s a s t o

refunded,

date after

The

the

t o t h e b u y e r s i s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t .

cannot

future

of

to

be

the

question

reserved

the

determination

at a

h a v i n g made and e n t e r e d i t s F i n d i n g s of

Fact

an e v i d e n t i a r y

now makes and e n t e r s t h e

for

of t h e amount of

the

hearing.

following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The sellers are unable to perform under the terms

of the real estate contract and convey unencumbered fee
simple title to the buyers.
2.

The easement and the aquaduct contained within the

easement constitute a substantial encumbrance to fee title.
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3.

The b u y e r s are relieved of any further

u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e r e a l

estate

obligations

c o n t r a c t and/or are

e n t i t l e d to a r e s c i s i o n of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t .
4.

The buyers did not waive t h e i r r i g h t to require the

sellers

t o p e r f o r m u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e r e a l

estate

contract.
5.

Waiver of t h e r i g h t

sellers

of the buyers to require the

t o p e r f o r m and/or to rescind the contract i s not a

d e f e n s e to the s e l l e r s 1 i n a b i l i t y to perform under the facts
of t h i s case.
6.

t h e b u y e r s elected to act upon the s e l l e r s 1

After

anticipatory
relieved

b r e a c h of t h e c o n t r a c t

of the obligation of further performance under the

t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t
filing

and/or

t o rescind the c o n t r a c t , by

l e g a l a c t i o n , there is no evidence of any conduct on

the part
their

and t o seek to be

of t h e b u y e r s which would c o n s t i t u t e a waiver of

right

relieved

to r e q u i r e the s e l l e r s

t o perform, or to be

of f u r t h e r obligation under the terms of the r e a l

e s t a t e contract and/or to rescind the c o n t r a c t .
7.

The buyers are e n t i t l e d to a deed which conveys fee

s i m p l e unencumbered t i t l e to the land without the easement
and t h e a q u a d u c t

and the buyers are not required to accept

defective t i t l e .
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8.
convey

The r e a l
fee

demonstrates

estate

simple,
good

c o n t r a c t requires the s e l l e r s to

unencumbered

title

which

title

and m a r k e t a b l e t i t l e , f r e e and c l e a r of

the e x i s t e n c e of the easement and t h e aquaduct.
9.
parties

The a m e n d m e n t s

entered

do n o t

the

relieve

into

sellers

by and between t h e
of the o b l i g a t i o n

to

convey fee simple unencumbered t i t l e t o t h e b u y e r s .
10 .

The "as i s " p r o v i s i o n s c o n t a i n e d in paragraph 5 of

the

r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t r e l a t e t o t h e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n of

the

p r o p e r t y and have nothing t o do with w a r r a n t i e s of

as s e t f o r t h in paragraph 8 of t h e r e a l e s t a t e
11.
relieve

The s e l l e r s
the

h a v e made no c l a i m

title

contract.
that

t h e y can

p r o p e r t y of t h e easement by having t h e easement

and t h e p i p e l i n e changed or removed.
12.
in

this

The d o c t r i n e of a n t i c i p a t o r y breach i s
case

obligation

and t h e
under

sellers
the

applicable

a r e unable t o perform t h e i r

contract

to

convey

fee

simple

unencumbered t i t l e t o t h e b u y e r s .
13.
available
contract

The b u y e r s
arising
by t h e

immediately

had

out

several

of

the

sellers.

alternative

remedies

a n t i c i p a t o r y breach of t h e

The buyers "were not r e q u i r e d t o

make an e l e c t i o n t o a c t upon t h e

anticipatory

b r e a c h of t h e c o n t r a c t , or t o seek t o be r e l i e v e d of
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further

obligation
and/or

to perform

to

under

the

terms

of

the

contract,

r e s c i n d the c o n t r a c t or t h e r e f o r e be held t o have

waived t h e i r r i g h t t o so a c t .
14.

The Gla s sman c a s e

sellers

by t h e

b u y e r s and t h e

" h i t s t h e n a i l on t h e head", wherein i t s t a t e s ,

respondent
that

cited

c o n t r a c t e d t o f u r n i s h a good t i t l e , and t h e

"the
fact

he was u n a b l e t o do so i s h i s m i s f o r t u n e , and not t h e

f a u l t of t h e
15.

appellant."

The c o n t r a c t i s s u b j e c t t o r e s c i s i o n .

16.

The b u y e r s

payments

made.

If

may be e n t i t l e d t o some refund of t h e
the

parties

cannot

enter

into

an

a g r e e m e n t as t o t h e refund t o be made, t h e p a r t i e s a r e t o be
directed

to

request

a date

for

an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g so

t h a t t h e m a t t e r can be r e s o l v e d .
17.
the

A partial

buyers

perform

summary

determining

that

judgment should be g r a n t e d t o
the

sellers

are

unable

to

u n d e r t h e terms of t h e c o n t r a c t , t h e buyers a r e not

obligated

to

further

perform

under

the

terms

of

the

c o n t r a c t , a n d / o r t h e buyers a r e e n t i t l e d t o r e s c i s i o n of t h e
real estate
18.

The f a c t t h a t t h e buyers a r e e n t i t l e d t o a summary

judgment
under

contract.

d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e s e l l e r s a r e unable t o perform

the

terms

of

the

contract,
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the

buyers

are

not

obligated
contract,
ends

the

to

further

perform

under

the

terms

a n d / o r a r e e n t i t l e d t o r e s c i s i o n of t h e
contract

between

the

of

the

contract,

p a r t i e s , and t h e s e l l e r s '

a c t i o n for f o r e c l o s u r e f a l l s of i t s own w e i g h t .
19.

A summary

judgment

the s e l l e r s 1 complaint for
20.
the

A partial

court

partial

summary

Dated t h i s

dismissing

foreclosure.

summary

incorporating

should be e n t e r e d

j u d g m e n t s h o u l d be e n t e r e d

t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e c o u r t i n t o

judgment.
£_ day of A p r i l ^; 1 9 8 6 .
COURT:

RONALLD 0 .
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HYDE, ^JUDdE

by
the

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I mailed
Conclusions

a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
of Law to the following this rVj'"* day
* — of~* M&fe^,

1986.
John P. Ashton
Erik Strindberg
Attorneys at Law
Third Floor Mony Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James Z. Davis
Attorney at Law
1020 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah 84401
David C. West
Attorney at Law
1300 Walker Bank BldgSalt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bruce Maak
Attorney at Law
Suite 1300, 185 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffry R. Burton
Attorney at Law
2606 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Jack L. Schoenhals #2881
Attorney for Plaintiffs
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-8823

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 90135

Plaintiffs,
vs
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT A. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, AND
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE,
Defendants.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, AS TRUSTEE FOR
PHILIP COMBE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASPER J. BREUER AND
WILLIAM M. HARRISON,
Defendants.

Civil No. 90793

r

* \

The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came on r e g u l a r l y for
before
the
of

the

Honorable

above-entitled
December,

Plaintiffs,

hearing

Ronald 0. Hyde, one of t h e Judges of

C o u r t , in h i s courtroom on t h e 19th day

1985,

at

t h e hour of 2:00 o ' c l o c k , p . m . ,

Breuer-Harrison,

Inc.,

the

Casper J . Breuer and

W i l l i a m M. H a r r i s o n , were r e p r e s e n t e d by Jack L. S c h o e n h a l s ,
the

Defendants,

represented
Froerer,

Combe and E v e l y n

Ashton,

the

Fund was r e p r e s e n t e d

Defendant

this

by J o h n

P.

Combe, were

Defendant,

Robert

was not p r e s e n t or r e p r e s e n t e d , t h e Defendant

Guaranty

Davis,

Keith

First

the

by D a v i d

West,

E.

Title

and

the

S e c u r i t y Bank was r e p r e s e n t e d by James Z.

Court

having

reviewed t h e f i l e s and r e c o r d s in

matter

and having heard argument of counsel and having

Memorandums

s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Court and having reviewed t h e

same and having e n t e r e d i t s Ruling on Motions, now mctkes and
enters the

following:

I T I S HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED a s

1.
Breuer
be

and

The P l a i n t i f f s ,

I n c . , Casper J .

and William M. H a r r i s o n ' s Motion for Summary Judgment
the

determined
and t h e

Breuer-Harrison,

follows:

same
that

First

is

the

hereby

granted

and

it

is

hereby

s e l l e r s K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe,

S e c u r i t y Bank a r e unable t o perform under t h e
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terms

of

the

unencumbered
determined

Plaintiffs

the

under

effect

e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and a r e unable t o convey

fee simple t i t l e t o t h e b u y e r s .

that

obligations
The

real

of

buyers

the

the

are

terms

relieved

Bank,
for

further

of any f u r t h e r

of t h e r e a l e s t a t e

contract.

of

to

decision

the

court

is

a r e s c i s s i o n of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t

i n t o by and between t h e s a i d P l a i n t i f f s
2.

It is

grant
entered

and D e f e n d a n t s .

K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and The F i r s t

Security

N.A., Ogden Utah, as T r u s t e e for P h i l i p Combe's Motion

Summary Judgment a g a i n s t Casper J . Breuer and William M.

H a r r i s o n , be and t h e same i s hereby d e n i e d .
3.

B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , Casper J . Breuer and William

M. H a r r i s o n

may be e n t i t l e d t o some refund of payments made

t o K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and The F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank,
N.A.,

Ogden U t a h ,

First

S e c u r i t y Bank, N.A., Ogden Utah, as T r u s t e e for

Combe,

the

a s T r u s t e e for P h i l i p Combe.

As t o The
Philip

l i a b i l i t y may be l i m i t e d as provided in t h e Utah

Code A n n o t a t e d
an a g r e e m e n t

75-7-306.

If t h e p a r t i e s cannot a r r i v e a t

among t h e m s e l v e s

as t o t h e refund,

they a r e

i n s t r u c t e d t o c o n t a c t t h e c a l e n d a r c l e r k and have t h e m a t t e r
s e t for an e v i d e n t i a r y

hearing.
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7c
Dated this

4?

day of Ap£i:& 1986.

BY T#£"")COURT:

)tfALD 0 . HYDE, JUDGE
RDI

T

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment to
the following this •£>?v— day of April, 1986.
John P. Ashton
Erik Strindberg
Attorneys at Law
Third Floor Mony Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James Z. Davis
Attorney at Law
1020 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah 84401
David C. West
Attorney at Law
1300 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bruce Maak
Attorney at Law
Suite 1300, 185 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffry R. Burton
Attorney at Law
2606 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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SJ

Jack L. Schoenhals
^-.^V^'V'
A t t o r n e y for Breuer-Har^(go i ri a
721 Kearns B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101
Telephone No. 363-8823

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
\

BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER and WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

\

ORDER AMENDING FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

•

\

Plaintiffs,
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, and
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE,
Civil No. 090135
Defendants.

KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee
for Philip Combe,
Plaintiffs,
CASPER J. BREUER AND
WILLIAM M. HARRISON,

C i v i l No. 90793

Defendants.

The
before
the

a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came on r e g u l a r l y for
the

Honorable

above-entitled

hearing

R o n a l d 0. Hyde, one of t h e Judges of

Court,

in

his

courtroom,

Ogden C i t y , ^S?

W*

~^9

"T31
973
Weber
hour

County
of

9:00 a . m . ,

Conclusions
Robert
First

Municipal

E.

of

on O b j e c t i o n s

Law f i l e d

Froerer,

Security

Breuer

and

Building,

on J u l y 1 0 , 1 9 8 6 , a t

t o t h e F i n d i n g s of F a c t and

by K e i t h P. Combe, E v e l y n Combe,

Attorneys

Title

G u a r a n t y F u n d i n g and

Bank, N.A. ; B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n ,

William

Inc.,

K e i t h P. Combe and E v e l e n Combe were

by

Ashton,

P.

Theodore

E.

by

West,

David

represented,
in

this

Robert

Kanell,

E.

Froerer

T i t l e G u a r a n t y F u n d i n g was

First

Fact

and

nor

records

now makes

following:

following

dated

May

6,

follows:

numbered p a r a g r a p h s of t h e
1986,

are

Findings

h e r e b y amended t o r e a d

follows:
3.

by

represented

S e c u r i t y Bank was n e i t h e r p r e s e n t

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED a s

of

represented

c a s e and h a v i n g h e a r d a r g u m e n t of c o u n s e l ,

The

J.

was r e p r e s e n t e d

t h e Court having reviewed t h e f i l e s

and e n t e r s t h e

1.

Casper

M. H a r r i s o n were r e p r e s e n t e d by J a c k L.

Schoenhals,
John

the

The

insurance,

Sellers
which

paid

was

insureds.
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for

issued

a p o l i c y of
to

the

title

Buyers

as

as

1

r

~~
foTT'
• J-.O.D,

- •
J

!

L
4.

• •. . *

The Buyers and S e l l e r s entered into four

amendments t o t h e r e a l
altered

" '

estate

contract

which

t h e t e r m s and conditions of the payments

due under t h e t e r m s of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t .
The d a t e s the four amendments were executed are as
follows:

11/24/82;

1/3/83;

and two amendments

were executed on 2/26/84.
9.

Prior

t o the year 1983, the existence of

t h e e a s e m e n t and the aquaduct were not disclosed
by t h e S e l l e r s

t o t h e Buyers, were not noted in

t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , or shown as an exception
on t h e p o l i c y of t i t l e

i n s u r a n c e issued to the

Buyers.
12.

P a r a g r a p h 12 of the Findings of Fact is

h e r e b y determined to be a Conclusion of Law and i s
h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e C o u r t as a Conclusion of
Law.
16,

P a r a g r a p h 16 of the Findings of Fact is

h e r e b y determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is

h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e C o u r t as a Conclusion of
Law.
18.

P a r a g r a p h 18 of the Findings of Fact is

h e r e b y determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is
h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e Court as a Conclusion of
Law.
19.

P a r a g r a p h 19 of the Findings of Fact is

h e r e b y determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is
h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e C o u r t as a Conclusion of
Law.
21.

The Buyers made a s u b s t a n t i a l

effort,

over a s u b s t a n t i a l period of time, to see if they
could m i t i g a t e

t h e i r damages and/or mitigate the

i m p a c t of t h e easement and the aquaduct upon the
property,

and in t h i s

regard,

they hired

the

s e r v i c e s of various engineers and examined several
alternative

methods of d e v e l o p i n g the property

a r o u n d t h e easement and the aquaduct p r i o r to the
time

that

they

filed

legal

action

and were

{

•? " ) / • > ;

^:^z:'-L,.o\:

±0.0

9.31

-*

;
i

justified

in

d e l a y i n g t h e f i l i n g of l e g a l

u n t i l they made t h a t
27.
be

by

the

an a g r e e m e n t

any,

determination
evidentiary
2.

The

Conclusions

to

the

if any, t o

Buyers,

is

a

If t h e p a r t i e s cannot a r r i v e a t

b e t w e e n themselves as t o t h e amount

t o be r e f u n d e d ,
if

of the refund,

Sellers

q u e s t i o n of f a c t .

refund,

effort.

The q u e s t i o n

paid

action

t h e q u e s t i o n of the amount of t h e
will
at

have
a

to

future

be r e s e r v e d for a
date

after

an

paragraphs

of

hearing.

following

numbered

the

of Law dated May 6, 1986, a r e hereby amended t o

read as f o l l o w s :
11.

Paragraph

11 of t h e Conclusions of Law

is

hereby

d e t e r m i n e d t o be a Finding of Fact and

is

hereby

adopted

by t h e

C o u r t as a Finding of

Fact.
3.

Except

as p r o v i d e d

herein

by t h i s

Order, which

modifies

and amends t h e F i n d i n g s of Fact and Conclusions of

Law,

other

all

Objections

-5-

made by t h e

parties

to

the

982

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, except as granted
herein, are hereby overruled and denied.
50

Dated this

day of July, 1986.

BY TEE-'CQURT:

)TO^/^.

RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDC
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify
John
Floor

P.

t h a t I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order,

Ashton,

Erik

S t r i n d b e r g , Attorneys at Law, Third

MONY Plaza, 424 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah

8 4 1 1 1 ; James Z. Davis, Attorney at Law, 1020 F i r s t
Bank B l d g . ,
Law,

Ogden,

Utah

Security

84401; David C. West, Attorney at

1300 Walker Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Bruce

Maak,

Attorney

City,

Utah

650 C l a r k

at

Law, Suite 1300, 185 S. S t a t e , Salt Lake

84111;

and Theodore E. Kanell, Attorney a t Law,

Learning

Bldg.,

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101,

VV^~day of J u l y , 1986.

v
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC. ,
CASPER J . BREUER and
WILLIAM HARRISON,

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN
COMBE,f ROBERT E. FROERER,
and ATTORNEYS1 TITLE GUARANTY
FUND, INC. , and FIRST SECURITY
BANK OF UTAH, N. A. , TRUSTEE,
Case No.

90135

Defendants.

Combes

have

filed

cross-claim

against

Defendants

Attorneys 1 T i t l e Guaranty Fund and Robert E. Froerer.

The basic

f a c t s of the cross-claim are that Froerer was contacted by real
e s t a t e agent Steve Keil in the summer of 1979 to a s s i s t

in the

sale and t r a n s f e r of such p r o p e r t i e s as owned by Combes.

Froerer

prepared

the

agreements,

which were

of

property

to

Breuer

Harrison,

Contract,

which

Breuer-Harrison.

and

became

the

sales

used

in

the

sale

including

the

Real

agreement

between

the

Estate

Combe and

The Real Estate Contract s t a t e s t h a t the s e l l e r

warrants t i t l e and w i l l pay for t i t l e

policy.

The real

estate

agreements were gone over by Combe's a t t o r n e y , Paul Kunz, prior

87 8
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to

closing.

The

closing

documents

apparently

Froerer, but he did not handle the closing.
Combe

and

Breuer-Ear rison

Funds

for

title

not

issued

requested,

was

policy were

entered

paid

until

November, 1980.

none

was

done,

and

prepared

between

z9,

1979.

December

to Froerer, but the policy
No prelimary
the

contract

title
was

report

entered

the benefit

was
into

Combes 1 claim damages against Froerer for breach of duty

manner

so

estate

contract

as

to

detect
to

failed

themselves,
Attorneys 1

to

the

upon the title

accept

the

issued

Guaranty

search
a

title,

and

and

by

diligent

drafting

claim

relief

a

real

against

Title Guaranty Fund under the title policy

it is difficult
Title

pipeline,

warrant

Froerer and Attorneys 1

ATGF

was

of a title

by failing to conduct a title search in a reasonable and

which

by

The contract

into

between Breuer-Karrison and Combe without
search.

were

pipeline.

to tell

Fund

is

conducted

policy

of

Under

the

pleadings

just what the claim
other

than

it

states,

by Robert E. Froerer,

title

insurance

against

to

based

defendants
plaintiffs

Breuer-Harrison on or about November 1 4 , 19 80.
I
against
which

hold

loss
the

or

that

the

damage,

company

may

policy
costs,

become

of

title

attorneys 1
obligated

to

insurance
fees,
pay,

and

insures
expenses,

sustained

or

incurred, by the insured, by reason of any defect in, or lien, or
encumbrance upon such title.

o >-; a
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The insureds are Breuer-Harrison, Inc., the holders of
the equitable estate created by a Uniform Real Estate Contract
dated January 9, 1980, executed by Keith B. Combe and Evelyn
Combe, his wife, as seller, and Casper J. Breuer and William M.
Harrison, as buyers.
I

hold

that

the

rescission

of

the

contract

between

Breuer-Harrison and Combe, while an election of remedies between
Breuer-Earrison and Combe is not an election of remedy, insofar
as the insurer is concerned.
stop loss and

damage

by

Rescission does not necessarily

reason of

insofar as the insurance is concerned.

the defect

in the title,

Insurance is an indemnity

policy, and is not rescinded because the underlying contract is
rescinded.
Combe is not a named insured and is not covered by the
policy.

While the policy is generated by the contract of sale,

the policy is for the benefit and protection of the buyers.
policy

does not

insure seller.
the closing.

guarantee

sellers1

performance,

nor

The

does it

Froerer prepared the paperwork; he did not handle
There was no preliminary title report in question,

and no indication that Combe relied upon any preliminary title
certificate and/or search prior to closing.

oon
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Combe's motion for summary judgment against Attorneys1
Title Guaranty

Fund

and Robert Froerer

is denied.

Froerer's motion against Combe is granted.
Breuer-Harrison and Attorneys1

ATGF and

The dispute between

Title Guaranty Fund is reserved

for trial.
DATED this ^ T day of May, 19 87.

RONALD 0. HYDE, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^h

day of May, 1987, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motions for
Summary Judgment was served upon the following:
Jack L. Schoenhals
Attorney for Breuer-Harrison
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Theodore E. Kanell
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorney for Defendant Froerer
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Erik Stindberg
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDAHLER
Attorney for Defendants Combe
424 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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David E. West
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WES'i
Attorney for Defendant ATGF
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
D. R. Chambers
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorney for First Security Bank
1020 First Security Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84401

^VL>vA .
PAULA CARR, S e c r e t a r y
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David E. West 3427
Armstrong, Rawlings & West
Attorneys for Defendant
Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc.
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 359-2093

WEBER c V u V S CLERK
RICHARD*. GREECE

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BREUER-HARRISON, INC.,
CASPER J. BREUER and
WILLIAM HARRISON,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
KEITH P. COMBE AND EVELYN
COMBE, ROBERT E. FROERER
AND ATTORNEYS1 TITLE
GUARANTY FUND, INC., and
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., TRUSTEE,

Civil No. 90135

Defendants.
The parties herein having filed various motions for
summary judgment against each other and all pending motions
for summary judgment having come on for oral argument on the 6
day of May, 1987, and the plaintiffs being represented at said
hearing by their attorney, Jack L. Schoenhals; and defendants
Combe being represented at said hearing by their attorney,
John P. Ashton; and defendant Robert E. Froerer being represented at said hearing by his attorney, Theodore E. Kanell;
and defendant Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. being

i o

represented at said hearing by its attorney David E. West, and
the parties having filed memorandums of authority in support
of their respective positions, and the Court having taken said
motions under advisement and having then issued its written
ruling setting forth its reasons and conclusions for the within summary judgment,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant Combes1 Motion for Summary Judgment against

defendant Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. and Robert E.
Froerer is denied.
2.

Defendant Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund!s Motion for

Summary Judgment against defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn
Combe is granted.
3.

Defendant Robert E. Froerer1s Motion for Summary

Judgment against defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe is
granted.
4.

The dispute between plaintiffs and defendant Attor-

neys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. is reserved for trial.
EY THE COURT this _r__

day of June, 1987.

V^ RONALD O . ' H Y D E '
DISTRICT JUDGE .

- 2 -

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the 9 day of June, 1987, I maila copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment to the following:
Mr. Jack L. Schoenhals
36 South State Street
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Erik Strindberg
Prince, Yeates and Geldzahler
City Center One, Suite 900
175 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Bruce A. Maak
Rooker, Larsen Kimball & Parr
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Theodore E. Kanell
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Mr. Jim Davis
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
2404 Washington Boulevard, #1020
Ogden Utah 84401
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RONALD 0. HYDE, Judge

BRUERER-HARRISON, INC.,

Case No.

Plaintiff,

Date:

vs.

90135

9-21-87

*

Vicki Godfrey, Reporter

KEITH COMBE, ETAL.,
*

Defendant.

S. Taylor, Court Clerk

This is the time set for PreTrial and Motions.
Plaintiff was represented by Jack Schoenhals, Esq.
Defendant

Combe, was present and represented

by John

Ashton, Esq.
Defendant Title Guarantee, was represented by David E.
West, Esq.
Defendant Robert Froerer, was represented by Ted Kanell,
Esq.
Issues and motions presented to the Court by plaintiff's
counsel:
Scope of trial presented by plaintiff's counsel to the
Court.
1. equity issue presented to the Court.
2. rescission

(paid FMV rental amount) issue presented

to the Court.
3. issue as to insurance.
4. issue as to property back interest.
Response by Mr. West.
Response by Mr. Kanell.

page 2 pretrial
90135 9-21-87
Bruerer-Karrison
vs. Combe
Both

counsel

concur

with

plaintiff's

counsel

on the

issues of trial and no jury needed.
Response by Mr. Ashton.
Statement by Mr. Schoenhals.
Statement by Mr. West.
Statement by Mr. Kanell.
Statement by the Court to counsel, Court finds this to
be two 2 cases.
Court to hear the issue of, what if any monies to be
given

back

(rescission

action).

All

other

matters

separate

issues to be heard at a later time.
Statement by all counsel.
Court ordered the trial to go forward, September 22,
1987 at 10:30 a.m., a jury will be called.

TabL

Jack L. Schoenhals (#2881)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2344

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER : ORDER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
:
HARRISON,
:
Plaintiffs,
vs.

:

,
'') '

:

KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE,

: CIVIL NO. 090135
:
:
:

KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for
Philip Combe,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASPER J. BREUER AND WILLIAM
M. HARRISON,
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the Judges of the
above-entitled Court, in his Courtroom, on January 22, 1988,

at the hour of 9:00 a.m., pursuant to the Defendants Combes1
Motion for a New Trial, the Plaintiffs were represented by
Jack L. Schoenhals, the Defendants Keith Combe and

Evelyn

Combe were represented by John Ashton, the Defendant Clair
Combe

was

represented

by

Bernard

L. Allen, the

Defendant

Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund was represented by David West,
Jr.,

the

Hansen,

Defendant

Epperson,

Robert
& Smith,

E.

Froerer

was

represented

the Court having

reviewed

by
the

files and records in this matter and having heard argument of
counsel, now therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants Combes1 Motion
for a New Trial be, and the same is hereby denied.
Dated this

/ (p day of >a^uary, 1988.

2
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
da

Order to the following, this 2

Y of ^Eabsia-ry, 1988.

Erik Strindberg, Esq.
City Center One, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bruce A. Maak, Esq.
185 South State, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James Z. Davis, Esq.
79 South Main, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Bernard L. Allen
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Theodore E. Kannell, Esq.
650 Clark Learning Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David E. West, Esq.
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

\

t
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Jack L. Schoenhals (£2881)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2344

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

SECOND REVISED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
Civil No, 090135
vs.
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE,
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for
CLAIR C. COMBE,
Civil No. 90793

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASPER J. BREUER AND WILLIAM
K. HARRISON,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly

for trial

commencing on September 22, 1987, at 9:30 a.m., before the
Honorable

Ronald

0.

Hyde,

District Judge,

on the

limited

1

issues of the total amount of payments made by Plaintiffs to
the

Defendants

Security

Keith

Bank, N.A.,

P.

Combe,

Evelyn

Combe

Ogden Utah, as Trustee

and

First

for Clair C.

Combe, and the amount of restitution and/or refund to be paid
by the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and Clair C.
Combe

(substituted

Plaintiffs,
regarding

the

the

party

Court

claims

for First Security

having
of

determined

the Plaintiffs

Bank),

that

the

against

to the
issues

Robert E.

Froerer and the Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund were to have
been severed and tried at a subsequent date, and the said
parties not being present, but their counsel being present to
observe

the

participate
Harrison

proceedings,
in

being

the
present

but

not

proceedings,
and

having

being

the
been

permitted

Plaintiff
sworn

and

to

William
having

given testimony, and being represented by Jack L. Schoenhals,
the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe having been
present and having been sworn and having given testimony, and
being

represented

by John Ashton and Erik Strindberg; the

interests of Clair C. Combe being represented by counsel for
Keith P, Combe and Evelyn Combe; the parties having called
additional
testimony

witnesses who were

sworn

and

having

and evidence, and the Court having

introduced

received

the

same, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Keith P. Combe
2

and Evelyn Combe having rested their case, and the matter
having been fully argued and presented before the Court, and
the

Court

having

granted

Plaintiffs1

the

Motion

for

a

Directed Verdict and for a Judgment, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiffs, Casper J.

Breuer

and

William M.

Harrison as buyers; and Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and
First Security Bank, N.A., Trustee, as sellers, entered into
a Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979.
2.

Pursuant to the terms of the Real Estate Contract,

the buyers (Plaintiffs) paid the sum of $75,000.00 as a down
payment.
3.

The

amendments

to

buyers
the

and

real

the

sellers

estate

entered

contract which

into

four

altered

the

terms and conditions of the payments due under the terms of
the real estate contract, but in all other respects, the Real
Estate Contract remained in full force and effect.
4.
execute

The Real Estate Contract required the sellers to
and

deliver

to

the

buyers

or

assigns,

good

and

sufficient warranty deeds covering title to the property.
5.
sufficient

The

sellers

warranty

were

deeds

unable

to

unencumbered
3

convey

by

good

and

title

to

the

real

property

described

in the Real

Estate

Contract.

In this

regard there is a 30 foot wide easement which traverses the
property diagonally in a northwest direction and within that
easement is an irrigation aqueduct of substantial size.
6.
the

The easement and aqueduct are neither described in

Real

Estate

obligations

of

Contract
the

nor

sellers

are

they

to convey

excepted

good

and

from

the

sufficient

warranty deeds free and clear of liens and encumbrances.
7.
could

The Court previously

not

convey

by

good

determined

and

that the

sufficient

warranty

sellers
deeds

unencumbered title to the real property described in the Real
Estate Contract and could not comply with paragraph 8 of the
Real Estate Contract and could not convey title to the real
property free and clear of the easement and aqueduct.
8.
and

The Court previously determined that the easement

aqueduct

were

not

a minor

inconvenience, but

instead

constituted a substantial encumbrance to the fee title to the
property.
9.

The Court previously determined that the buyers were

relieved of any further obligation to perform under the terms
of the Real Estate Contract.
10.

The Plaintiffs made the payments required under the

terms of the Real Estate Contract for the years 1980, 1981,
4

1982, and 1983.
11.

In

the

year

1983, the Defendant

Keith

P.

Combe

desired to borrow money against the balance due on the Real
Estate Contract, and came to the Plaintiffs for permission to
borrow against the equity of the Combes, and in the process,
provided a Title Report to the Plaintiffs which showed that
there

was

an

property.

easement

which

ran

diagonally

across

the

The Plaintiffs made inquiry and investigation into

the status of the property and confirmed the existence of the
easement.
12.

The

investigate

Plaintiffs

the

impact

asked
of

their

the

engineering

easement

and

to

firms

to

determine

whether or not the easement would prohibit or substantially
interfere with the development of the property.
13.

For

the

next

several

months

thereafter,

the

Plaintiffs investigated various alternative ways to overcome
the effect of the easement and to see if it was possible for
them

to

retain

the

property

and

develop

the

property

profitably, notwithstanding the existence of the easement.
14.

The Plaintiffs made a substantial effort, over a

substantial period

of time, to see if they could mitigate

their damages and/or mitigate the impact of the easement and
the aqueduct

upon the property,
5

and

in this regard, they

hired

the

services

of

engineers

and

examined

alternative

methods of developing the property around the easement and
aqueduct, but concluded that it was not possible to develop
the property profitably given the purchase price, the cost of
engineering and expenses necessary to overcome the easement
and the aqueduct and the loss of market value of the lots as
a result of the existence of the easement and the burdens
associated with the easement.
15.

The easement was subject to several burdens and

requirements which included the following:
a.

The

concrete

necessity

bridging

or

of placing
strain

some

relief

form

of

over

the

aqueduct before a road could be constructed

over

the aqueduct, the cost of which made the placement
of

a

road

over

the

aqueduct

too

expensive

to

reasonably consider for development purposes,
b.

The

right

of

access

remaining

in

the

conservancy district to repair or replace the line.
c.
restoration

The

obligation

of

the

cost

of

of the surface, after replacement

the
or

repair, being placed upon the owner of fee title to
the land.
16.

The Plaintiffs met with the Combes for the purpose
6

of attempting

to resolve

Combes would

their differences

to see if the

reduce the purchase price so that they could

make the development of the property a profitable venture,
but the Defendant Keith P. Combe advised the Plaintiffs that
he would not be willing to reduce the purchase price,
17.
action

On

October

1,

1984,

the

Plaintiffs

filed

this

seeking alternative remedies against the Combes and

other parties.
18.

The

Plaintiffs

subsequently

filed

a

Motion

for

Summary Judgment in which they requested a rescission of the
Real Estate Contract.
19.
and

The Court awarded the Plaintiffs a Summary Judgment

determined

that

the

Defendants were unable

to

convey

title as promised in the Real Estate Contract and the Court
determined
Contract,

that
have

Plaintiffs were
an

Order

of

entitled

Rescission

to terminate the
entered,

and

were

entitled to a refund.
20.

The

Court

directed

the

parties

to

attempt

to

resolve, between themselves, the amount of the refund to be
paid, and if they could not resolve the matter to come back
to the Court for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of the
refund to be paid to the Plaintiffs.
21.

The parties could not resolve the matter between
7

themselves and the case was set for trial.
22.
cancelled

The Plaintiffs were unable to locate one or more
checks

demonstrating

payments

of

principal

and

interest to the Combes and First Security Bank, as trustee
for Clair C
they

had

Combe, and although the Plaintiffs claimed that

made

total

$217,575.25, the

contract

Plaintiffs

payments

and

in

Defendants

the

entered

sum

of

into a

Stipulation that the Defendants would stipulate and agree and
the Plaintiffs were willing to stipulate and agree that they
had

paid

the

total

sum

of

$216,069.69

in

payments

of

principal and interest and the additional sum of $15,13 3.00
for real estate taxes for a total agreed upon payment by the
Plaintiffs to the Defendants of principal, interest and taxes
in the sum of $231,202.00.
23.

The accrued interest on the payments from the date

the payments were made to and including December 1, 1987, is
in the sum of $132,595.72, and the accrued interest on the
payments made on the taxes is in the sum of $596.92 for a
total of $133,192.64 prejudgment interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of the payments to and including May
14, 1981 and at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of
the

payments

additional

to

and

interest

including
to

March

December
1,
8

1988

1,
is

1987, and
in

the

sum

the
of

$5,764.21, for a total judgment, together with interest in
the sum of $370,158.85.
24.

Fair rental value or fair market rental means the

amount for which the property in question could be leased in
the market with a willing lessor and a willing lessee dealing
at

arms1

length,

neither

being

compelled

to

lease

the

property, and is the equivalent of the amount for which a
willing lessor and a willing lessee would be willing to lease
the property in its present condition.
25.

The fair market rental of the property is dependent

upon the market place and a rental figure which is in excess
of that which a willing lessee would be willing to pay for
the lease of the property is excessive and does not represent
the true fair market rental value.
26.

The property which is the subject matter of this

action has been utilized for many years for the purpose of
growing alfalfa.
27.

There

is a market

in the Weber County

area

for

rental of unimproved property for alfalfa fields, and other
agricultural purposes.
28.

The highest and best use for the property which is

the subject of this action, in its present

state, is for

agricultural purposes for either alfalfa, melons, Christmas
9

trees, or other such similar agricultural use and the sum of
$75.00 per acre times 20 acres or a total sum of $1,500.00
per year is the reasonable fair market rental value of the
property

which

should

be

credited

to

the

Combes

as

a

deduction from the refund to be paid by the Combes to the
Plaintiffs.
29.
property

The
is

ultimate
for

highest

residential

and

best use

development, but

for the

real

in order

to

achieve the highest and best use, substantial time, money and
effort must be expended to achieve the highest and best use.
30.

The

(residential
appropriate

highest

and

best

use

of

the

property

development) requires that it be platted, the
governmental

agency

approve

the

plat

and

the

property be developed with the addition of water, sewer and
utilities, curb, gutter and roadway.
31.
there

For the years

was

a

1980, 1981, 1982

substantial

dispute

and

among

in to 1983,
the

various

governmental entities as to which entity would provide sewer
services to the property in question.
32.

Shortly after the Plaintiffs entered into the Real

Estate Contract to purchase the land they proceeded

forward

to attempt to get the property platted, the plat approved and
sewer and water available for development of the property.
10

33.

As

governmental

a

result

of

entities . as

the
to

dispute

the

between

sewer

various

connection,

the

Plaintiffs did not develop the property for a period of time.
34.

Whether

or

not

the

property

could

be

developed

economically without attachment to a community sewer system
and whether or not the moratorium issued by the governmental
authorities
questions

prohibited

which

development

substantially

of

the

impacted

property

upon

the

were

economic

feasibility of developing the property during the first few
years

after

Plaintiffs

had

entered

into

the

Real

Estate

Contract with Defendants and delayed the development of the
property.
35.

The

Plaintiffs

proceeded

forward

to

attempt

to

develop the property through the years 1980, 1981, and 1982,
and in the process of attempting to develop the property, had
hired

the

services

of

Great

Basin

Engineering

to

perform

percolation tests, to prepare a plat for the property, and to
assist the Plaintiffs in obtaining subdivision approval from
the government authorities.
worked with the governmental

In addition, the Plaintiffs had
authorities

in an attempt to

resolve the dispute between the governmental entities as to
which

entity

would

provide

the

property.

11

sewer

services

to

the

36.

The property

has

subsequently

been

annexed

as a

result of the efforts of the Plaintiffs, and sewer connection
is now available and because of the present condition of the
property and the zoning and the community services available,
the property can now be developed for residential use.
37.
ran

When the Plaintiffs discovered

diagonally

across

the

property,

that the

consisted

easement

of

30 !

a

easement and had other attendant difficulties attached to the
easement, they expended a substantial quantity of time and
money in an effort to see if they could overcome the effect
of the easement and to develop the property economically.
38.
that

they

profitable

During the summer of 1984, the Plaintiffs concluded
would

be

manner,

unable
given

to
the

develop
extent

the
and

property
nature

in a

of

the

easement and the cost to overcome the difficulties posed by
the easement and those which might be posed by the easement
in the event the restrictions and conditions regarding the
easement were enforced rigidly, and the Plaintiffs went to
the Combes to ask the Combes to make a concession

in the

purchase price so that they could proceed forward to develop
the property in a profitable manner.
39.

Keith Combe refused to grant a price concession and

the Plaintiffs filed legal action.
12

40.

Defendants1

The

expert

witness

and

appraiser,

William Christensen, did not give testimony as to the fair
market

rental

value

of

the

property,

but

instead,

gave

testimony of the fair rate of return that might be expected
from the profitable development of real estate based upon an
assumption

of

an

expected

annual

rate

of

return

on

the

investment at the rate of approximately 10% per year or an
annual expected rate of return in the amount of $49,350.00
per year; and then testified that the expected annual rate of
return
would

on the
be

investment

equated

to

fair

at a fixed percentage
market

rental.

The

of return
appraiser

testified, however, that the definition of fair market value
was the most probable sale price that would occur when two
people were to negotiate at arms1

length with neither being

compelled to sell or to purchase, and that if there were no
buyer at the asking price, that the law of supply and demand
would

cause the price to be dropped until

it reached

the

level of demand.
41.
expected

Since
to

pay

no

potential

lessee

$4 9,3 50.00 a year

could
for the

be

reasonably

rental

of the

property, the expected rate of return did not equate to the
fair market rental of the property and could not be utilized
for the purpose of determining the fair market rental of the
13

property.
42.

The

Defendants

offered

no

other

testimony

concerning the fair market rental of the property other than
the testimony of William Christensen as to the fair rate of
return that a person might expect on an investment, and which
rate of return was not the equivalent

of the

fair market

rental of the property.
43.
Plaintiffs

The issue of the amount of the payments made by the
to

the

Defendants

was

resolved

by

stipulation

between the parties.
44.

The only remaining issue to be determined was the

fair market rental value of the property.
45.

The matter before the court was and is an issue of

equitable restitution and the Defendants are not entitled to
a jury trial on the equitable issues.
46.

The matter was not

one which

should

have

submitted to a jury for the following reasons:
a.

The

Plaintiffs

and

the

Defendants

had

stipulated as to the amounts which had been paid by
the Plaintiffs to the Defendants for principal and
interest and had stipulated as to the amounts which
the Plaintiffs had paid for taxes

and there was no

issue to be resolved concerning the payments made
14

been

by the Plaintiffs.
b.

The amount of interest to be credited to

the Plaintiffs was not contested by the Defendants.
c.

There was only one remaining issue to be

resolved, and that was the fair market rental value
of the property.
d.

There was no evidence or testimony offered

by the Defendants of the fair market rental value
of the property.
e.

The

only

evidence

of

the

fair

market

rental value of the property was offered

by the

Plaintiffs and that value did not exceed the sum of
$1,500.00 per year.
f.

The case involved issues of equity and the

jury opinion would have been advisory only.
g.
jury

There was nothing left to submit to the

since there was no evidence of fair market

rental other than that submitted by the Plaintiffs.
47.

The Court determined that the matter should not be

submitted to the jury for an advisory opinion and the Court
determined that it should rule on the facts and the law and
should grant the Plaintiffs1 Motion for a Directed Verdict
and/or for a Judgment.
15

i O 1 1

48.

The Plaintiffs were entitled to a directed verdict

and/or a judgment to be entered in their behalf in the amount
Plaintiffs had paid to Defendants and had paid for taxes on
the real property, and for the interest which had
thereon

from the date of the payments, and the

accrued

Defendants

were entitled to a credit for the fair market rental value of
the property, together with interest thereon, which the Court
determined did not exceed the sum of $1,500.00 a year.
49.

The

Defendants

Keith

P.

Combe

and

Evelyn

Combe

received 74.6% of the payments and the benefit thereon, and
the Defendant

First Security Bank as trustee

for Clair C,

Combe received 25.4% of the payments and the benefit thereon.
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact,
now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This is a case in equity and the only issues being

tried are those of equitable restitution upon a judgment of
rescission.
2.

The Defendants

Court accommodated
the

anticipation

are not entitled to a jury.

the Defendants1
that

the

jury

The

request for a jury with

would

render

an

advisory

opinion.
3.

The combination of: the issue of the amount of the
16

payments

made

by

Plaintiffs

to

Defendants

having

been

resolved by stipulation between the parties; and the amount
of the interest due on the payments being uncontested by the
Defendants;

and

the

failure

of the

Defendants

to

provide

competent evidence to demonstrate that the fair market rental
of

the

property

exceeded

the

sum

of

$1,500.00

per

year;

constituted sufficient cause and justification for the Court
to determine

and

conclude

that there was nothing

left to

submit to the jury and that it would be improper to submit
the matter to the jury.
4.
in

The Court was justified in dismissing the jury and

granting

a

directed

verdict,

and/or

Judgment

for

the

Plaintiffs for the sums of money paid by the Plaintiffs and
as

stipulated

by

the

parties

and

in

awarding

to

the

defendants a credit in an amount equal to the maximum amount
demonstrated to be the fair rental value of the property.
5.

The

Plaintiffs

are

entitled

to

a

Judgment

determining that they paid to the Defendants the total sum of
$216,069.69
additional

in payments on principal
sum

of

$15,133.00

and

for real

interest

and the

estate taxes

for a

total agreed upon payment by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants
for principal, interest and taxes in the sum of $231,202.00.
6.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment awarding
17

them prejudgment interest from the date of the payment of the
principal,

interest

and

taxes

in the

sum

of $133,192.64,

together with the additional sum of $5,764.21

representing

the interest to March 1, 1988.
7.

The Defendants are entitled to a credit against the

judgment for the reasonable rental of the property

for the

years

sum

1980,

1981,

1982,

1983,

and

1984

in

the

of

$1,500.00 per year for a total sum of $7,500.00 credit with
interest

thereon

including

at

the

rate

of

10% per

annum,

to

and

the 22nd day of September, 1987, in the sum of

$3,562.50 and from September 22, 1987 to March 1, 1988 in the
sum of $330.82, for a total credit of $11,392.82.
8.
evidence
rental

The Defendants introduced no credible or competent
or testimony
of

the

to demonstrate that the

property

would

have

exceeded

fair market
the

sum

of

$1,500,00 per year<>
9.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest

at the legal rate of 10% per annum from the date each payment
was made by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants.
10.

In an equitable case of rescission, the Plaintiffs

are entitled

to a refund

of the payments they have made,

including both principal and interest, and payments of real
property taxes and the Defendants are entitled to a credit
18
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for the fair market rental value of the property during the
time that the Plaintiffs had possession or control over the
property.
11.

The expected rate of return on an investment is not

equivalent to the fair market rental value of property in
question.
12.
question

The
in

highest

its

and

present

best

use

condition

of
was

the

property

in

for

agricultural

purposes.
13.

The ultimate highest and best use of the property

was for residential development purposes, but Defendants were
not entitled to a credit for the fair market rental value of
the

property

in

its

final

development

stage

since

that

contemplated the expenditure of substantial sums of money to
develop the property, the obtaining of governmental approval
and the uncertainties of the profitability of such a venture.
14.

The issue of either the Plaintiffs1

knowledge of

the easement or the Defendants1 knowledge of the easement, is
not relevant in an action for equitable restitution where the
Court has

rescinded

the

Contract

for the reason that the

sellers are unable to convey the title the sellers contracted
to convey in the Real Estate Contract.
15.

The

Plaintiffs

are

entitled
19

to

have

judgment

entered in their behalf and against the Defendants Combes for
the sums found, less the credit for the fair market rental
value of the property, together with interest and costs.
16.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to a vendee's lien upon

the property until the judgment awarded the Plaintiffs has
been paid in full.
Dated this

/h

day of March, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

U^_ „,-JC-

U

RONALD 0. HYDE, JU0GE
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650 Clark Learning Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David E. West, Esq*
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

V

\

r\
\s.A-.-

21

19

TabN

Recorded Boot^-."^.V>

Page . ..£ A«...'.
Indexed

.';-.

Jack L. Schoenhals (#2881)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2344

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M.
HARRISON,

SECOND REVISED JUDGMENT
U-. 7

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 090135
vs,
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE,
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
TRUSTEE;
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for
CLAIR C. COMBE,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 90793

vs,
CASPER J. BREUER AND WILLIAM
M. HARRISON,
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly

for trial

commencing on September 22, 1987, at 9:30 a.m., before the
Honorable

Ronald

O.

Hyde,

District Judge, on the

limited
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issues of the total amount of payments made by Plaintiffs to
the

Defendants

Security

Keith

Bank, N.A.,

P.

Combe,

Evelyn

Combe

Ogden Utah, as Trustee

and

First

for Clair c.

Combe, and the amount of restitution and/or refund to be paid
by the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and Clair C.
Combe

(substituted

Plaintiffs,
regarding

the

the

party

Court

claims

for First Security

having
of

the

determined
Plaintiffs

Bank),

that

the

to the
issues

against Robert

E.

Froerer and the Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund were to have
been severed and tried at a subsequent date, and the said
parties not being present, but their counsel being present to
observe

the

participate
Harrison

proceedings,
in

being

the

but

not

proceedings,

present

and

having

being

the
been

permitted

Plaintiff
sworn

and

to

William
having

given testimony, and being represented by Jack L. Schoenhals,
the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe having been
present and having been sworn and having given testimony, and
being

represented

by John Ashton- and Erik Strindberg; the

interests of Claim c. Combe being represented by counsel for
Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe; the parties having called
additional
testimony

witnesses

who were

sworn

and

having

and evidence, and the Court having

introduced

received

the

same, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Keith P. Combe
2
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and Evelyn Combe having rested their case, and the matter
having been fully argued and presented before the Court, and
the

Court

having

granted

Plaintiffs1

the

Motion

for

a

Directed Verdict and for a Judgment, the Court having made
and entered its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, now
therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a

judgment against the Defendants Keith P. Combe and
Combe,

calculated

as

follows:

the

sum

of

Evelyn

$231,202,00,

together with pre-judgment interest in the sum of $133,192.64
and $5,764.21, for a total sum of $370,158.85 x 74.6%, for a
total

judgment

jointly

against

and severally,

Plaintiffs be and the

Keith

P.

Combe

and

Evelyn

Combe,

in the sum of $276,138.50, and the
same are hereby

awarded

a judgment

against the Defendant Clair C. Combe, calculated as follows:
the sum of $231,202.00, together with pre-judgment interest
in the sum of $133,192.64 and $5,764.21, for a total sum of
$370,158.85 x 25.4%, for a total judgment against Clair C.
Combe

in

the

sum

of

$94,020.35,

together

with

interest

thereon against the said Defendants at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date hereof until paid.
2.

The Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and
3
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Clair C. Combe, be, and the same are hereby awarded a credit
against

the

aforesaid

Judgment

in the

sum

of $11,392.82,

which credit represents the fair market rental value of the
property during the years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984,
3.

The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a

vendee's lien on the property which is the subject matter of
this action and which is described as follows, which
shall

remain

upon

and

against

the

following

lien

described

property until the aforesaid judgment, together with interest
and costs is paid in full.

The real property is described as

follows:
PARCEL 1;
Beginning at the Southwest corner of the Northwest
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 238 feet,
thence North 9 00 feet, more or less, to the center
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said
centerline to a point North of beginning, thence
South 930 feet, more or less, to the place of
beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 2:
Beginning at a point 763 feet East of the Southwest
corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Running
thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet,
more or less, to the centerline of Combe Road,;
thence Northwesterly along said centerline to a
point North of beginning; thence South 750 feet,
more
or less, to the point of beginning.
Containing 2,75 acres.
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PARCEL

3:

Beginning at a point 937.36 feet East of the
Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey;
running
thence
East
60.73
feet;
thence
Northeasterly to a point on the center of Combe
Road, said point being East 197.88 feet and North
0004l30,t West 571.02 feet to the centerline of
Combe Road and Northwesterly along said centerline
15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centerline of
said road to a point North of beginning; thence
South 625 feet to the place of beginning.
PARCEL 4:
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest
corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running
thence East 250 feet, thence North 835 feet, more
or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence
Northwesterly along said centerline to a point
North of beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or
less, to the place of beginning.
Containing 5
acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5:
Beginning 488 feet East of the Southwest corner of
the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 275
feet, thence North 750 feet, more or less, to the
center of the County Road, thence Northwesterly
along the center of said County Road to a point
North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of
beginning, thence South 835 feet, more or less, to
the point of beginning. Containing 3.40 acres.
4.

The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded

their costs of Court.
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Dated this

cpl^

/ £ day of March, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

r

-/^V/
RONALD (5. HYDE, JUDQE

s

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Judgment to the following, this

3~~ day of March, 1988.

Erik Strindberg, Esq,
John Ashton, Esq.
City Center One, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bruce A. Maak, Esq.
185 South State, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bernard L. Allen, Esq,
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Theodore E. Kannell, Esq.
650 Clark Learning Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David E. "West, Esq.
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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